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ADVISING CLIENTS TO APOLOGIZE
JONATHAN R. COHEN*
I. NINTRODUCTION
Imagine that a child damages his neighbor's house. Playing baseball
after school, Hank, age eleven, hits a ball hard but foul, flying from his bat
toward and then through a window of his neighbor Mr. Cleary's house.
What should Hank do? Sneak into Mr. Cleary's house and retrieve the ball
before Mr. Cleary gets home from work? Hope that Mr. Cleary won't no-
tice? In tears, Hank enters his own home to tell his mother what has hap-
pened. They talk about it and decide that the right thing for Hank to do is
to apologize and make amends. Upon seeing Mr. Cleary arrive home,
Hank is to go directly to Mr. Cleary's house, say he is sorry for breaking
the window, offer to pay for a new window, and promise that he won't
play ball in a way that might risk damaging Mr. Cleary's house again.
Imagine instead that an adult damages his neighbor's house. Mr.
Tiller has long dreamed of converting the flat grass of his back lawn into
an elegant rock garden accented by a small hill. One spring weekend, he
hires a gardener to relandscape. Using light machinery, the gardener digs
into the lawn and piles soil to form a small hill. Several weeks later, a tor-
rential rain shower hits. Peering out his living room window, Mr. Tiller
sees that his yard contains not only a small hill, but also a large pool of
water. This pool stretches from the foot of the new hill into his neighbor
Ms. Jones' lawn. It reaches up to her back porch-or what used to be her
* Assistant Professor, University of Florida, Frederic G. Levin College of Law. A.B., 1987,
Harvard University; J.D., 1992, Harvard Law School; Ph.D., 1993, Harvard University. I thank Robert
H. Mnookin, Frank Sander, David Hoffman, Allen Ferrell, Lara Schwartz, Michael Moffitt, B.J.
Krintzman, Elizabeth Jardine, Susan Heitler, Terry Burnham, Kathleen Valley, Karen B. Cohen, par-
ticipants in seminars at Harvard, Florida, Vanderbilt, Missouri, and Colorado Law Schools, and the
editors of the Southern California Law Review for their helpful comments. This Article was written
while I was a Hewlett Fellow at Harvard Law School's Program on Negotiation. I thank the Hewlett
Foundation for its financial support and the members of the Program on Negotiation for their moral
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back porch! Mr. Tiller can see that one of the comer posts of that back
porch has collapsed, apparently slipping at its base. Further, the pool of
water covers that spot. What should he do? Mr. Tiller knows that Ms.
Jones, who lives alone, has recently left for a two-week vacation. Dis-
traught, Mr. Tiller phones his lawyer.
"Whatever you do," says the lawyer, "don't run over and apologize
when Jones gets back from vacation. That would just make you look bad.
Also, don't call your gardener to have him flatten the hill before Jones gets
back. That too would just make you look bad. Who knows, maybe the
post's collapsing had nothing to do with your hill. Perhaps the severity of
the rain was the root cause of the damage, or maybe the wood supporting
the porch was simply rotten. By the time Jones gets back from vacation,
the pool may have cleared. Just wait and see what happens. Jones might
not even suspect that your hill was involved with the damage to her porch,
but even if she does, it's likely she won't be able to prove it."
How different are the ways we counsel children and adults to act
when they have injured others. Parents, or at least good parents, teach
children to take responsibility when they have wronged another: Apologize
and make amends. In contrast, lawyers typically counsel the opposite.
Most lawyers focus on how to deny responsibility, including what defenses
a client might have against a charge and what counterclaims. If a lawyer
contemplates an apology, it may well be with a skeptical eye: Don't risk
apology, it will just create liability. While the lawyer-client relationship is
of course different from the parent-child relationship, the fact that parents
frequently advise children to apologize, but that lawyers rarely advise cli-
ents to apologize,' ought to give us pause.2 If apology is often in the best
interest of children, could it often be in the best interest of adults?
The failure to apologize can also be a central factor in escalating
conflict. A friend's account of a restaurant incident conveys this well. "I
was having lunch at a small cafe several years ago and found a small piece
of glass in my food. I called the waiter to tell him about it, so that they
would know about it in case they had other food in their kitchen containing
glass. I thought that they would say they were sorry for serving me food
with glass in it, but they wouldn't. Perhaps they thought that they had a
1. I know of no empirical study describing how frequently lawyers discuss apology with clients.
However, from many conversations with lawyers and clients, and from my own time in legal practice,
my sense is that discussing apology with a client is rare, though not nonexistent.
2. A factor behind this difference may be that parents generally care about the character and
moral development of their children far more than lawyers care about the character and moral devel-
opment of their clients.
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potential lawsuit on their hands. I had no intention of suing, but when they
said that there was no way the glass could have come from their kitchen, I
became incensed. How dare they not apologize for serving me food with
broken glass in it!" In the extreme, one hears of examples where an in-
jured party never would have brought suit had the offender apologized 3 or
would have dropped the suit had the offender apologized.4
At times a vicious cycle may arise. An offender who wants to apolo-
gize, but fears being sued, may refrain from apologizing-and the absence
of an apology is precisely what triggers the suit. The medical malpractice
setting provides a striking example. Although a physician may wish to tell
a patient when he has made a mistake, lawyers often order doctors to say
nothing.5  The physician's silence may then trigger the patient's anger.
"[Patients] ... want to know why their trusted caregiver is suddenly not
talking to them, and why they're seeing the hospital lawyer or risk manager
[instead of the physician] .... That's an incredibly divisive wedge to put
between a patient and a health-care provider... ,"6 This alienation may
then prompt the patient to sue. For example, a study of families who sued
their physicians following prenatal injuries found that twenty-four percent
filed medical malpractice claims when "they realized that physicians had
failed to be completely honest with them about what happened, allowed
them to believe things that were not true, or intentionally misled them."7
3. Colleague Doug Stone reports that in years of teaching hundreds of lawyers a negotiation
exercise of a "borderline" sexual harassment case in which a female employee thought that her termi-
nation may have resulted from her rejections of a male supervisor's friendly overtures, none of the law-
yers would have brought suit if the offender-supervisor had apologized for those overtures, but if the
offender-supervisor had not apologized, many would have brought suit. See DOUGLAS STONE,
WEATHERS AND EVANS (1996).
4. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 5-6 (Kenneth Arrow, Robert Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky & Robert Wilson eds.,
1995) (describing a dispute between Art Buchwald and Paramount Pictures which Buchwald would
have settled for "a minimal sum of money and... an apology," but, as Paramount would not apologize,
three years of bitter litigation ensued). See also Stephen B. Goldberg, Eric D. Green, & Frank E.A.
Sander, Saying You're Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221 (1987), who state that,
[m]any mediators have had one or more experiences in which an apology was the key to
a settlement that might otherwise not have been attainable. At times, all the injured
party wants is an admission by the other party that he or she did wrong; no more is nec-
essary to achieve a settlement.
5. See Denise Grady, Doctors Urged to Admit Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at F9.
6. Id.
7. Gerald B. Hickson, Ellen Wright Clayton, Penny B. Githens & Frank A. Sloan, Factors That
Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA
1359, 1361 (1992) [hereinafter Hickson]. Further, 19% of those filing suit said they did so out of "a
desire to deter subsequent malpractice by the physician and/or seek revenge." Id. Such filings also
may have been prevented by an apology. Other studies report similar results. See Charles Vincent,
Magi Young & Angela Phillips, Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives
Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCEr 1609, 1612 (1994) (study of British patients and families finding
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Given these reasons for filing suit, one would think that a sincere apology
could have prevented many of those suits. Aside from the serious ques-
tions of medical ethics involved with doctors putting their interests ahead
of their patients',8 surely something is amiss when physicians want to
apologize, when patients would appreciate receiving a apologies, but the
fear of liability stops physicians from apologizing-which in turn prompts
a lawsuit.
And what of morality? Respect for others would seem to require that
when an offender has hurt someone, she should apologize to the extent that
she feels at fault. As a mother whose ten-year old son was injured by a
reckless driver said to me recently, "What a jerk! He never even said that
he was sorry." Though failing to apologize for an injury that one has
committed is common, it is nevertheless morally offensive. While a sig-
nificant fraction of civil defendants are at bottom guilty of having wrong-
fully injured another, I would expect that only a very small fraction ever
apologized or were ever advised by their lawyers to apologize. To the
contrary, often offenders are explicitly instructed by their lawyers, or their
insurance companies, not to apologize.9 This stands in stark contrast to
37% may not have brought malpractice suits had there been a full explanation and apology, more sig-
nificant factors than monetary compensation); Amy B. Witman, Derek M. Park & Steven B. Hardin,
How Do Patients Want Physicians to Handle Mistakes, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2565, 2568
(1996) (survey finding that in cases of moderate physician error, only 12% would sue if physician in-
formed patient of error, but if physician did not inform patient of error, 20% would sue if later learning
of error); LaRae L Huycke & Mark M. Huycke, Characteristics of Potential Plaintiffs in Malpractice
Litigation, 120 ANNALS OF INTRNALMED. 792,792 (1994) (finding poor relationship with health care
provider and impression of not being kept appropriately informed by health care provider significant
factors prompting patients to contact plaintiff's attorneys). See also Ann J. Kellett, Comment, Healing
Angry Wounds: The Role of Apology and Mediation in Disputes Between Patients and Physicians,
1987 Miss. J. Disp. RESOL. 111, 126-27 (stressing the importance of apology in managing patient-
physician disputes); Francis H. Miller, Medical Malpractice Litigation: Do the British Have a Better
Remedy? 11 AM. J.L & MED. 433, 434-35 (1986) (describing the markedly lower incidence of mal-
practice suits and much greater role of apology in cases of medical error in Great Britain as compared
to the U.S.); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43 U. KAN. L REV.
39, 68 (1994) ("When physicians are more forthright about what has occurred and assume responsibil-
ity for it, patients are less likely to sue.").
8. See Daniel Finkelstein, Albert W. Wu, Neil A. Holtzman & Melanie K. Smith, When a Phy-
sician Harms a Patient by Medical Error: Ethical, Legal, and Risk Management Considerations, 8 J.
CLINICAL ETHICs 330 (1997); Albert W. Wu, Thomas A. Cavanaugh, Stephen J. McPhee, Bernard Lo
& Guy P. Micco, To Tell the Truth: Ethical and Practical Issues in Disclosing Medical Mistakes to
Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 770 (1997); Michael R. Robin, Dana D. Brian & Timothy J.
Rumsey, Truth-Telling, Apology and Medical Mistakes, 7 MED. J. ALUNA 3 (Summer 1998). Such
questions include the extent of a patient's right to know information about his health and whether a
physician has a professional duty to put his patient's interests before her own.
9. Counseling denial extends well beyond lawyers. A friend's insurance company provided
him with a small, wallet-sized card titled, "What to do when [you are] involved in a car accident." The
bottom line of the card reads, "Keep calm, don't argue, accuse anyone, or admit guilt." See also
1012 [Vol. 72:1009
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practices in other societies, such as Japan, where apology plays a central
role, if not the dominant role, in dispute resolution.10
Such factors prompt a question: Should lawyers discuss the possibility
of apology with clients more often? In this Article I argue that, in civil
cases, lawyers should discuss with clients the possibility of apology more
often than they now do." Not only is apology morally right and socially
beneficial, but in many cases making an apology is in the client's
(defendant's) best interest. This is not to say that there are no risks asso-
ciated with apology, not the least of which is the fear that an apology can
be used against one's client in court as an admission of fault. However,
when attention is paid to the context in which an apology is offered and
how it is made, often "safe" apologies posing relatively little risk of in-
creased liability can be offered. Further, the possible benefits of apology
to the client (defendant) are under-recognized.
Grady, supra note 5 (describing hospital managers, lawyers, and insurance companies that advise doc-
tors not to admit mistakes to patients). Even the police appear to have entered the business of advising
against apology. A colleague reports a car accident in which his sister, when turning at an intersection,
failed to notice a car in front of her and rammed into it from behind. When the police arrived, the sister
was profusely apologizing to the driver of the car that she hit. A police officer interrupted, pulling the
sister to the side, and told her that she shouldn't say anything-it could just be used against her in
court.
10. On the centrality of apology to dispute resolution in Japan, see Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur
Rosett, The Implications ofApology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 L & Soc'Y
REV. 461,464 (1986) ("[In Japan,] [t]he availability of social restorative mechanisms like apology ob-
viates formal legal sanction in many cases."); John 0. Haley, Comment. The Implications of Apology,
20 L. & Soc'Y REv. 499 (1986); Robert B. Leflar, Beyond Compensation: Personal Injury Compen-
sation in Japan: Values Advanced and Values Undermined, 15 U. HAW. L REV. 742 (1993). See also
Ken-ichi Ohbuchi, Masuyo Kameda & Nariyuki Agarie, Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in
Mediating Appraisal of and Response to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2, 219-27
(1989) (psychological experiments using Japanese subjects demonstrating the importance of apology to
injured party). On the significance of apology in other societies, see Letitia Hickson, The Social Con-
texts of Apology in Dispute Settlement: A Cross-Cultural Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 4, 283 (1986)
(describing a cross-cultural, anthropological study with special emphasis on Fiji suggesting a correla-
tion between apology and social hierarchy); Carol LaPrairie, Conferencing in Aboriginal Communities
in Canada: Finding Middle Ground in Criminal Justice, 6 CRIM. L.F. 576, 584 (1995) (emphasizing
the importance of apology in resolving criminal disputes in aboriginal communities in Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia); Miller, supra note 7, at 434-35; Kyu Ho Youm, Press Freedom and Judicial
Review in South Korea, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 26 (1994).
11. The criminal setting raises many interesting, but often distinct, issues related to apology,
such as the role of admissions of guilt in plea bargaining and the fact that the plaintiff in a criminal
case is the state, rather than the injured party. Accordingly, I limit my analysis to civil cases. For re-
lated discussions in criminal law, see Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1888 (1991); Richard Lowell Nygaard, On the Role of Forgiveness in Crimi-
nal Sentencing, 27 SETON HALL L REV. 980 (1997); Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 10, at 481-83.
See also infra note 63 (citing Victim-Offender Reconciliation Programs).
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After briefly defining apology, Part II of this Article examines bene-
fits and costs of apology to a client, avenues for "safe" apology which pre-
vent an apology from being used against the client to prove the client's li-
ability, and reasons that lawyers neglect discussing apology with clients.
The main lesson here is that, under the existing legal rules, apology could
be utilized much more than it now is. Part III discusses factors to which
lawyers who discuss apology with clients should be sensitive and offers
four examples of apology in the common civil settings of divorce, em-
ployment, car accident, and medical malpractice. Part IV explores legal
reforms to create more avenues for "safe" apology. Part V addresses two
ethical questions related to advising clients to apologize, namely (i) is it
wrong for an unremorseful offender to make an insincere apology with the
aim of gaining a strategic advantage, and (ii) is it wrong to make a "safe"
apology? Part VI concludes.
II. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF APOLOGY
A. DEFINITIONS
The word "apology" derives from the Greek root logos, meaning
"speech" or "word." Though originally associated with a formal justifica-
tion, defense or explanation (as in Plato's Apologia12), apology also refers
to remarks made following an injury, whether intentional or unintentional.
In this latter usage, an apology is defined as, "an acknowledgment intended
as an atonement for some improper or injurious remark or act: an admis-
sion to another of a wrong or discourtesy done him accompanied by an ex-
pression of regret,"'13 or, "[a]n explanation offered to a person affected by
one's action that no offense was intended, coupled with the expression of
regret for any that may have been given; or, a frank acknowledgment of the
offense with expression of regret for it, by way of reparation."' 14
The hallmark of an apology are the words, "I'm sorry." "I'm sorry
that my baseball smashed your window." "I'm sorry that my re-
landscaping may have caused your back porch to collapse." Yet the words
"I'm sorry," like apologies more generally, can have many possible inter-
pretations, and it is helpful to differentiate three elements often included in
an apology: (i) admitting one's fault, (ii) expressing regret for the injurious
12. See PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES (Thomas G. West trans., Comell Univ. Press 1979).
13. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY (1961).
14. OXFORD ENGUSH DICrIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
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action, and (iii) expressing sympathy for the other's injury. 15 The first
element addresses liability or culpability, while the second and third ele-
ments address the offender's feelings. For example, after a car accident,
the offender might say, "I am sorry about what happened. [i] It was my
fault: I wasn't paying attention to the road. [ii] I terribly regret that my car
hit yours from behind, and [iii] I hope that you and your family recover
quickly." Similarly, apology's counterpart-forgiveness---can be defined
in at least two ways: (i) releasing from liability and (ii) ceasing resent-
ment.
16
Unless otherwise noted, I shall use the term "apology" to incorporate
all three of the elements above, that is, an apology is an admission of one's
fault combined with an expression of regret for having injured another as
well as an expression of sympathy for the other's injury. However, by the
term "forgiveness," I mean only the cessation of resentment against the
injurer, but not a release from liability. Accordingly, an offender may
apologize for the harm he has done, and the injured party forgive him, but
the offender may still be obligated to compensate the injured party for the
harm done.
B. BENEFITS TO THE CLIENT
After an injury, it is easy for parties to see the world in zero-sum
terms. Having been harmed, the injured party may view the offender as an
adversary, and expect that what will be one side's gain will be the other
side's loss. The offender may fear such hostility from the injured party,
and may also adopt a zero-sum mind set. Further, post-injury negotiations,
like all negotiations, inevitably involve a distributive element. Often that
distributive element is quite large. For example, following a car accident,
the central question may be how much compensation the defendant's in-
surance company will pay to the injured party.
In contrast, apology and forgiveness can be value-creating. If I
apologize for having injured you, and you accept this apology, both of us
are likely to be better off. This does not mean that when an apology occurs
15. Some describe the step of admitting one's fault as accepting responsibility for the injury.
See, e.g., SUSAN HErrLER, THE POWER OF TWo 174 (1997). When the offender is not morally culpable
(as in a non-negligent accident), this alternative terminology is particularly useful.
16. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 14 (defining "forgive" as, "[1] to give up
resentment against, pardon (an offender) ... [2] to abandon one's claim against (a debtor)"). Parallel
to the subject of this Article, the question exists of whether lawyers should discuss the possibility of
forgiveness with clients more often (e.g., "This is the fourth action against your former spouse you've
brought in the past two years. Might you be better off 'moving on'?").
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distributive elements disappear. After an apology, the parties still may
need to settle on a level of compensation for the injury. For instance, after
Hank apologizes to Mr. Cleary, Hank still needs to pay for replacing the
broken window. 17 Rather, to say that apology and forgiveness can be
value-creating simply means that apology and forgiveness offer avenues
that can be beneficial to both parties. If the parties knew one another be-
fore the injury, an apology may be an important first step toward repairing
their relationship. Even in highly distributive, post-car accident negotia-
tions, an apology may help the injured party to feel less angry and the in-
jurer to feel less guilty. Below, I expand upon some of the potential
benefits of apology to one's client. However, let me first note several of
an apology's distinctive features.
Unlike many aspects of settlement, an apology is a "commodity"
which only the offender can produce. While Ms. Jones can hire many
people to repair her porch, if she wants an apology, only Mr. Tiller can of-
fer one. 8 In economic terms, the "market" for apology is monopolistic-
the injured party cannot get that apology elsewhere. The same applies to
forgiveness: It is a commodity best obtained from the injured party. 19
Some cases of apology raise what one might call issues of standing:
What right does the person offering the apology have to offer it, and what
right does the person receiving it have to receive it? Examples such as the
Japanese Prime Minister's apology to Korean "comfort women" forced to
be prostitutes in World War I1 ° and the recent proposal that President
Clinton make an apology for slavery21 spring to mind. Can the Japanese
Prime Minister or the American President apologize for national policies
which they played no part in developing? And who exactly would receive
17. For the tort of defamation, an apology plays a special role within American law by serving to
mitigate damages; however, an apology does not provide a defense to the cause of action itself. See
Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 10, at 479-81.
18. Sometimes offenders use agents to offer apologies. However, the authority to make the
apology must still come from the offender. Such a delegated apology may lack the force of a non-
delegated apology, as the sincerity behind the apology may be in question.
19. In general, one would think that the power of forgiveness lies primarily with the injured
party. At the minimum, it is up to the injured party to determine whether to accept that apology. Some
may feel that, in a deeper, religious sense, forgiveness lies not with the injured party, or, at least not
exclusively with the injured party, but with God. Forgiveness, like apology, raises standing issues.
20. See Yvonne Chang, Japanese Leader Writes Apology to 'Comfort Women,' WASHINGTON
POST, Aug. 15, 1996, at A34. For a historical review and criticism of the Japanese government's fail-
ure to admit and apologize for World War H1 atrocities, see IRIS CHANG, TIE RAPE OF NANKINO: THE
FORGOTEEN HoLOCAusT oF WoRLD WAR H ch. 10 (1997).
21. Compare Charles Krauthammer, Let's Shackle the Slavery Apology Idea, NEWSDAY (New
York), June 29, 1997, at G4, with DeWayne Wickham, Why Clinton Must Stop Dodging Slavery Apol-
ogy, USA TODAY, Dec. 16, 1997, at A15.
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the apology? In the Japanese example, former "comfort women" still liv-
ing would be the clearest recipients, but in the American case of slavery,
there are no former slaves still living. Standing issues often arise in the
organizational context. 2 For example, if a male supervisor sexually har-
asses a female employee, the president of the company may wish to
apologize to the employee, but may lack the standing to do so. Unless the
company was lax in preventing or stopping the sexual harassment, what
does the president have to apologize for? The president could certainly
express sympathy on behalf of both himself and the company, but the
president would be hard-pressed to admit fault if the company had no fault
to admit.
For an apology to comfort the injured party, it must be sincere, or at
least perceived to be sincere.23 As to why sincerity should be so important,
different theories may exist (such sincerity indicating that (i) the harmful
act will not recur, (ii) the offender has incurred a psychic "penalty" of an-
guish for the harm she caused, (iii) the offender wishes to have friendly,
rather than hostile relations, and (iv) the offender respects the injured
party), but when an apology is given too cavalierly, the listener may ques-
tion its meaning.24 I am reminded of a conversation with one of my high
school teachers. A father of two boys, this teacher said that his older son
found apologizing gut-wrenching, but that his younger son found apology
quite easy. The younger son would, as it were, apologize at the drop of a
hat. Was one approach better than the other? The teacher reported that an
aggrieved party-typically the mother-preferred receiving some apology
22. See NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION
chs. 3,4 (1991).
23. See Sim B. Sitkin & Robert J. Bies, Social Accounts in Conflict Situations: Using Explana-
tion to Manage Conflict, 46 HUM. REL. 349, 359 (1993) (discussing how psychological studies dem-
onstrate the importance of the perceived sincerity of the person offering an explanatory account). See
also TAVUCHIS, supra note 22, at 19 (discussing authenticity in apology); THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BLOODY
REVENGE: EMOTIONS, NATIONALISM, AND WAR 131-37 (1994). I do not advocate Machiavellian at-
tempts at insincere apology. See infra Part V. Many have lamented the recent use, and possible rise,
of insincere apologies, especially in politics. See, e.g., Meg Greenfield, The No-Fault Confession,
NEWSWEEK, June 15, 1987, at 80; Ellen Goodman, Nobody's Truly Sorry Anymore, CHARLESTON
GAzETTE & DAILY MAIL (W. Va.), May 18, 1995, at 4A; Deborah Sontag, Too Busy Apologizing to be
Sorry, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at E3; Louis Menand, Making Nice: Why Politics Means Always
Having to Say You're Sorry, NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 1998, at 5.
24. There is a tendency within economic analysis to think of goods (or commodities) in physical
terms and downplay nonphysical aspects of consumption. For critiques, see Thomas C. Schelling, The
Mind as a Consuming Organ, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 328 (1984), and Jonathan R. Cohen, On
Reasoned Choice 93-99 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with
author). Similarly, when analyzing settlements there may be a tendency to focus on pecuniary ele-
ments, and ignore nonpecuniary ones, such as apology.
1999] 1017
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rather than none. However, when an apology came from the older son, she
knew that it "meant something."
For an apology to be most effective, it must also be voluntary-made
of a party's own free will. Apologies are sometimes brought about from
external pressures rather than internal remorse, as when a child is forced
by a parent to apologize. However, in general, the more an apology is co-
erced, the less meaning it carries, for the less sincere is the regret it ex-
presses. In this regard, it is worth noting that even if court-ordered apol-
ogy were legal within the United States, which due to free-speech concerns
it is not, 5 an ordered apology would carry little meaning. As Justice
Pomeroy reasoned:
An apology is a communication of the emotion of remorse for one's past
acts. To order up that particular emotion, or any other emotion, is be-
yond the reach of any government; to assert the contrary is to advocate
tyranny. If, perchance, the Commission, in ordering a public manifesta-
tion of remorse, should be indifferent as to whether remorse in fact exists
but instead should desire only the outward act, then it would be either
extracting a lie from those willing to lie ("I'm sorry", but I'm really not)
or asking the courts of this State to hold in contempt those who will not
lie ("I'm not sorry and I will not say that I am"). Given the choice, I
would rather hold in contempt the former, not the latter. But in my view
the Commission should eschew purporting to order the expression of an
emotion, whether or not the emotion is in fact entertained by the one so
ordered.26
25. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding
freedom of speech includes freedom not to speak); Griffith v. Smith, No. LT-460-2, 1993 Va. Cir.
LEXIS 41, 37 (Cir. CL City of Richmond Mar. 4, 1993) ("First Amendment concerns preclude the
Court from ordering the apology suggested..."); Deborah K. Hepler, Providing Creative Remedies to
Bystander Emotional Distress Victims: A Feminist Perspective, 14 N. ILL. U. L REV. 71, 88 (1994)
(holding that court-ordered apology would be "analogous to specific performance of a personal service
contract, which is frowned upon in the law as akin to involuntary servitude"). See also United States v.
Acevedo, 117 F.3d 1429 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a judge's conditioning criminal's reduction in
sentence upon criminal's offering apology to victim an abuse of discretion).
An interesting contrast exists between Japan and Korea, where court-ordered apology exists as a
remedy in defamation cases and has been constitutionally upheld. See James J. Nelson, Culture,
Commerce, and the Constitution: Legal and Extra-Legal Restraints on Freedom of Expression in the
Japanese Publishing Industry, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN LJ. 45, 57 (1996); Youm, supra note 10, at 26.
In America, an apology may be a mitigating factor in a defamation case, but is not a legal remedy.
Cultural differences help explain this contrast in the availability of apology as a legal remedy. As Wa-
gatsuma and Rosett write, "Apology may be given a lower legal priority in the United States [than in
Japan] because American society does not place as high a value on group membership, conformity, and
harmonious relationships among people as Japanese society does." Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note
10, at 493. See also TAvucHIs, supra note 22, at 7-14, 37-44 (discussing the significance of apology
to group membership and social order and its role in Japan).
26. Pennsylvania Hum. Rel. Comm. v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881, 891
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With these comments in mind, let me now address more specifically
some of the value-creating benefits of apology.
1. Subtract Insult from Injury
An apology may help prevent piling insult onto injury, something
both parties may want. An injured party usually wants to receive an apol-
ogy, for absent an apology she may be angered to think that the offender
was glad to have caused the injury. Moreover, failing to apologize follow-
ing an injury can be a deeply disrespectful act and thus become a second
injury. Indeed, some injured parties attach far more value to an apology
than to compensation for their injuries. Further, many offenders want to
apologize to show respect for the person harmed and to try to make
amends.
2. Prevent Antagonistic Behavior
An apology can be an important step in preventing future antagonistic
behavior, including litigation. When an injury has occurred, there is a root
question to be resolved: Are you (the offender) my friend or my foe? An
apology signals that the offender wishes to establish or re-establish a
friendly relationship. It is a way of saying to the injured party: "I am your
friend, not your foe." Implicit in this statement is often a second one, "I
want to have constructive future interactions, not destructive ones." As
one might expect, this approach frequently works: The offender's apology
often catalyzes the injured party's forgiveness. 27
Indicating that one wants friendly relations may be one of the greatest
benefits of an apology. Even where the parties did not know one another
before the injury, the injury creates a relationship in which, if nothing else,
the offender and the injured party must address the extent of compensation.
There is a certain irony in such injury-generated relationships, for the per-
(1973) (Pomeroy, J., concurring). See also Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Requiring Apology as
"Affirmative Action" or Other Form of Redress Under State Civil Rights Act, 85 A.L.R. 3d 402
(1978).
27. See generally Michael E. McCullough, Everett L. Worthington, Jr., & Kenneth C. Rachal,
Interpersonal Forgiveness in Close Relationships, 73 J. PERSONALrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 321 (1997)
(empirical study showing that the offender's apology generates empathy on the part of the injured
party, which in turn leads to forgiveness). "It is well established that receiving an apology from one's
offender encourages forgiving .... particularly when apologies are elaborate and include admission of
guilt." Id. at 323 (citations omitted). See also Mary B. Harris, Mediators Between Frustration and
Aggression in a Field Experiment, 10 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. 561, 570 (1974) (demonstrating
that offenders who said "excuse me" after cutting in front of subjects in line were responded to less
aggressively than those who said nothing).
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son the injured party might least wish to deal with is the offender, but the
fact of the injury has created a relationship between the two. Even if Bill
and Fred were total strangers before Bill drove his car into Fred's, follow-
ing the accident Bill and Fred will likely have interactions concerning how
Bill should compensate Fred. Apologizing after an injury can be essential
to making that relationship a constructive one.
3. Repair Damaged Relationship
An apology may also help restore a damaged relationship between
parties. Many legal disputes arise in the context of a pre-existing relation-
ship (family, workplace, or commercial). Often these relationships are
very close ones. If a friend harms another friend, the injured friend may
well ask, "If we were friends, why did you injure me?" Absent an apology,
it may be impossible for parties to put a problem behind them and restore
their normal functioning. One aspect of this is the need to construct an
explanation for what has occurred.28 Paying monetary damages may help
take care of the financial consequences of an injury, but it may take an
apology to "wipe the moral ledger" clean and construct understandings of
the injury and the relationship which both parties can accept. In this re-
gard, the tendency of some persons to make reciprocating apologies should
be noted. At least in situations where both parties bear some fault, some
injured parties, if apologized to, almost automatically apologize back.
Similarly, parties who have reached an agreement following a dispute will
often conclude their conversations with a mutual exchange of apologies. 29
4. Permit Serious Settlement Negotiations
Indignity can be a large barrier to compromise, and in many cases, an
apology is needed before other aspects of the dispute, such as monetary
compensation, can be settled. As Goldberg, Green, and Sander write,
"[At] times, an apology alone is insufficient to resolve a dispute, but will
so reduce tension and ease the relationship between the parties that the is-
28. Parties in relationships often use accounts to understand their relationships. An injury may
not only damage a party, it can also damage the viability of the account(s) by which the parties under-
stand one another. Offering an apology can be an important step in creating a new account acceptable
to both parties. See generally Sitkin & Bies, supra note 23. See also ERVING GoFFMAN, RELATIONS
IN PUBIuc 113 (1972) ("[Alpologies represent a splitting of the self into a blameworthy part and a part
that stands back and sympathizes with the blame giving, and, by implication, is worthy of being
brought back into the fold."); SCHE', supra note 23, at 135-37.
29. See Deborah Levi, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1174 (1997)
(discussing "happy-ending" apologies).
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sues separating them are resolved with dispatch. 30 This observation has a
public policy corollary to which I shall return later: If we want to encour-
age the private settlement of, rather than the litigation of, disputes, allow-
ing parties to make apologies soon after an injury is critical.
5. Spiritual and Psychological Growth
Apology and forgiveness may also offer paths for spiritual and psy-
chological growth. By apologizing for, rather than denying or avoiding,
the damage he caused to his neighbor's window, Hank becomes a better
person. By falling to apologize, Mr. Tiller may no longer be able to look at
himself in the mirror, or, should he meet her again, look Ms. Jones in the
eye. Responsibility and respect, rather than denial and avoidance, lie at
apology's core. Within many religious and ethical systems, offering an
apology for one's wrongdoing is an important part of moral behavior, as is
forgiving those who have caused offense.31
Psychological evidence also supports the importance of apology, both
for the offender and for the injured party.32 An offender who fails to
apologize may suffer by harboring guilt, and an injured party who does not
receive an apology,33 or who fails to forgive after receiving an apology,
may suffer the corrosive effects of storing anger. While the psychological
benefit to the injured party of receiving an apology is well-recognized, the
psychological benefit to the offender of apologizing is often overlooked,
especially by lawyers. 34 This is not to say that making an apology should
30. Goldberg et al., supra note 4, at 221.
31. For references to philosophical and religious discussions of forgiveness, see McCullough et
al., supra note 27. See also Peter A. Kirkup, Some Religious Perspectives on Forgiveness and Settling
Difference, 11 MEDIATION Q. 79 (1993); Kenneth Cloke, Revenge, Forgiveness, and the Magic of
Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 67 (1993); Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996
J. DISP. RESOL. 1; Nygaard, supra note 11.
32. See generally Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children's Reactions to Apologies, 43
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 742 (1982); Marty H. Gonzales, Julie A. Hagen & Debra J. Man-
ning, Victims As "Narrative Critics" Factors Influencing Rejoinders and Evaluative Responses to
Offenders' Accounts, 20 PERSONATY & SOC. PSYCHOL BULL. 691 (1994); Michael N. O'Malley &
Jerald Greenberg, Sex Differences in Restoring Justice: The Down Payment Effect, 17 J. RES. IN
PERSONA=TY 174 (1983); McCullough et al., supra note 27; Ohbuchi et al., supra note 10. See also
Cloke, supra note 31; Harris, supra note 27; Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead, Say You're Sorry, PSYCHOL
TODAY, JanJFeb. 1995, at 45; Daniel W. Shuman, 77e Psychology of Compensation in Tort Law, 43
U. KAN. L. REV. 39 (1994); Williams, supra note 31, at 3-4, 53.
33. An injured party can always forgive (in the sense of ceasing resentment) the offender absent
the offender's apology, an important option for many.
34. As Gerald Williams writes:
[W]e usually think the lawyers' role, when representing defendants, is to protect their clients
from having to admit wrongdoing or having to make legal compensation for harms they
cause. But... just as there are negative psychological consequences to people who are
harmed, there are psychological consequences to those who do the harng ....
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fully assuage an offender's guilt or that following an apology all injured
parties should fully cease resentment. Nor is it to say that all persons feel
guilty if they fail to apologize for having injured another. However, many
offenders do feel guilty. Though often overlooked by lawyers, such spiri-
tual and psychological benefits may be central to a client's well-being, es-
pecially in the long run.
35
6. Strategic and Distributive Benefits
Making an apology can also benefit an offender in ways that are
largely strategic or distributive, rather than value-creating.
One strategic benefit of an apology is that, if the injured party re-
ceives the apology early enough, she may decide not to sue. For a legal
dispute to occur, injury alone is not sufficient. The injured party must also
decide to bring a legal claim.36 Taking the step to make a legal claim is
often triggered by the injured party's anger. An early apology can help de-
fuse that anger and thereby prevent a legal dispute.37 The lesson here is an
important one. While there are risks to making an apology, there are also
risks to not making an apology. Accordingly, even if an apology could be
used against the offender at trial as proof of the offender's liability (a topic
I will address shortly), in some cases it may still make sense for the of-
fender to apologize. The economically oriented might describe such an
apology as a gamble that an offender should take if and only if the ex-
pected benefits from doing so, which depend upon the extent to which an
apology would decrease the likelihood of suit, exceed the expected costs,
which depend upon the extent to which an apology would harm the of-
fender's case at trial.
Even if a suit occurs, apologizing may still be to the offender's stra-
tegic benefit. Offenders who apologize often look sympathetic to a judge
or jury. Further, where punitive damages are at issue, apologizing can be
Williams, supra note 31, at 53 (citations omitted).
35. Apology offers benefits for organizations analogous to the psychological and spiritual
benefits it offers for individuals. For example, an organization which apologizes for a wrongdoing may
be able to correct it, but one which does not may face both decreased morale and the inability to pre-
vent similar wrongdoings in the future. See, e.g., Eric May, Today's Army Could Take Lesson from
Gen. Lee, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 10, 1996, at A23 (describing the U.S. Army's lengthy struggles to cor-
rect internal sexual harassment problems).
36. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transfor-
mation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming .... 15 L. & SOC'Y REV. 631, 647-48 (1980-81)
[hereinafter Felstiner].
37. See Hickson, supra note 7, at 1359 (indicating that, in the perinatal setting, an early apology
may induce the injured party to forgo legal redress).
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strategically effective.38 Although an apology is formally a factor mitigat-
ing against punitive damages in only a few areas of legal doctrine (such as,
defamation 9 and invasion of privacy by use of plaintiff's name or like-
ness40), punitive damages are often awarded in response to a defendant's
lack of contrition.41 Hence, where the offender has apologized, judges and
juries may be less inclined to award punitive damages. 42 As Williams
writes:
[H]uman nature being what it is, we can probably assume that judges and
juries, if they were influenced by [an apology], would be inclined to
award lesser damages against a remorseful defendant and greater dam-
ages against a defendant who refuses to acknowledge, much less to
apologize for, the harm caused to the plaintiff.43
C. RISKS TO THE CLIENT
The risks of apology need to be weighed against its possible benefits.
Below I discuss four such risks to the client to which I attach the labels
psychological, strategic, void insurance coverage, and legal liability.
1. Psychological
Some clients may find making an apology to be demeaning, a psychic
cost that they do not wish to pay. Apology requires humbling oneself be-
fore another and admitting a wrongdoing. While one could argue that it is
precisely those clients who find apology most difficult who have the most
38. See Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, Legal Consequences of Apologizing, 1996 J. DIsP.
RESOL. 115, 122-26 (1996).
39. See supra note 17.
40. See Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiffs Name or Likeness in Advertising,
23 A.L.R. 3d 865, §8, at 892 (1969).
41. Apologies can mitigate an offender's punishment. See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 506
n. 1 (1972) ("Modification of contempt penalties is common where the contemnor apologizes or pres-
ents matters in mitigation."); Donald H. Kennedy, 75 M.S.P.B. 281, 286 (1997) (allowing supervisor's
genuine expression of remorse for using racist language as a mitigating factor in supervisor's disci-
pline); John J. Michalik, Annotation, Attorney's Addressing Allegedly Insulting Remarks to Court
During Course of Trial as Contempt, 68 A.LR. 3d 273, § 4b, at 282-84; Rehm & Beatty, supra note
38, at 122-27 (discussing the effect of an apology as mitigating factor in attorney discipline cases);
However, using apology to mitigate an offender's punishment differs from using it to limit the injured
parties' damages.
42. See Johnson v. Smith, 890 F. Supp. 726, 729 n.6 (1995) (holding that a racial attacker's
prompt apology was a significant factor in limiting punitive damages). Some may wonder whether it is
wrong for an offender to apologize, or for his lawyer to counsel him to apologize, motivated by the
hope of gaining strategic benefits rather than from feeling internal remorse. I discuss this ethical issue
in Part V.A infra.
43. Williams, supra note 31, at 52-53 n.147.
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to gain spiritually and psychologically from apologizing, the lawyer must
remember that her attitude toward apology may differ from that of her cli-
ent's. Further, when apologizing there is always the chance of being re-
buffed. Though having one's apology rejected may be rare, when it hap-
pens, it may be painful.
A lawyer can discuss such concerns with a client directly to try to
make them seem less daunting. For example, a lawyer might say, "Even if
you find apologizing demeaning, you might feel better in the long run for
having apologized," or, "In the rare event that your apology is rejected, you
might feel better knowing that you tried your best to do what you thought
was right." However, these psychological concerns should not be dis-
counted.
2. Strategic
Strategic risks, either in the case at hand or in one's other dealings,
may also inhibit apology. Though apology may help one develop "internal
strength" and "character," others may see apology as a sign of weakness.
For example, consider the position of President Clinton when he was first
charged with sexually harassing Paula Jones. Even if, arguendo, President
Clinton did sexually harass Paula Jones, and even if he wished to make full
and sincere apologies for it, Clinton may have believed that the political
costs of such admissions were prohibitive: His enemies could use such
apologies to force his impeachment. 4 Similarly, when Liggett tobacco
company "came clean" about past wrongdoings in the tobacco industry, it
risked incurring, and did incur, the wrath of the larger tobacco compa-
nies.45
However, the possibility that an apology will be perceived as a sign of
strength should not be overlooked. The leader of an organization may fear
the appearance of weakness in admitting to a mistake, when often the re-
verse is true: Admitting to the mistake-particularly if everyone already
knows about it-will make the leader look strong. Strength can have many
different meanings. If being strong means never making a mistake, then an
apology will be a sign of weakness, for it reveals that one has made a mis-
take. If instead being strong means being able to admit and correct the
mistakes one has made, then an apology can be a sign of such mature
strength. Put differently, it is the secure person, rather than the insecure
44. Clinton eventually settled with Jones for $850,000 but without an apology. See Neil A.
Lewis, Clinton Settles Jones Lawsuit with a Check for $850,000, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1999, at A14.
45. See Gail DeGeorge & Lori Bongiorno, How Badly Is Liggett Getting Burned?, Bus. WK.,
July 7, 1997, at34.
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person, who finds apologizing easiest. Hence, apologizing can be a sign of
security.46
3. VoidInsurance Coverage
In some cases, such as car accidents or medical malpractice, offenders
possess insurance coverage. At first, one might think that such insured of-
fenders should feel particularly free to apologize: If it is the insurance
company, rather than the offender, that will pay for the damages, what
does the offender risk by apologizing? There is much truth to this. How-
ever, the matter is not as simple as it might first appear, for a question
arises: Will making an apology void the offender's insurance coverage?
Most insurance contracts impose upon the insured a general duty of
cooperation with the insurance company in the defense of the claim.
47
Some insurance contracts also specifically prohibit the insured from volun-
tarily assuming liability,48 a restriction courts have taken as a condition
precedent to the contract.49 Accordingly, two questions arise. Would the
insured's apology be considered a breach of the insured's general duty of
cooperation? And, if the insurance contract specifically forbids the insured
from assuming liability, would the insured's apology be taken as a breach
of (a condition precedent to) that contract?
The answer to the first question is no. For the insurer to prevail by
asserting the insured breached the general duty of cooperation, the insurer
must show that the insured acted in bad faith50 and that the insured's action
substantially or materially prejudiced the insurer.51 Short of a case of col-
lusion between the insured and the injured party, showing bad faith seems
most unlikely.52 Indeed, the insured may even argue that he was trying to
46. Lawyers in particular may overlook this potential benefit to apology, as lawyers often benefit
from reputations for being relentless fighters who don't "give in." See infra Part II.E.9.
47. See 8 JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4771
(1981) [hereinafter 8 APPLEMAN]; JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
§31.9 (1994).
48. See KENNETH ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 450 (1990). Stempel notes
that the duty to cooperate under such general commercial liability policies "is at least as stringent as
that contained in the usual auto policy .... STEMPEL, supra note 47, at 769.
49. See 8 APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at § 4780; 14 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 51:22 (2d ed. 1981).
50. See 8 APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at § 4776.
51. See id. at §§ 4772,4773.
52. Cases on the duty of cooperation typically concern matters quite different from apology. See
8 APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at § 4774 (insured's failure to answer insurer's questions), § 4779
(collusion between insured and plaintiff), § 4782 (insured's nondisclosure of facts), § 4783 (insured's
variant testimony at trial), and § 4784 (insured's attendance at trial).
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help minimize the loss to the insurance company by apologizing.5 3  Fur-
ther, if when apologizing the insured simply tells the truth, while some
damage may be done to the insurance company's bargaining power, gen-
erally speaking, one would think that this prejudice would not be substan-
tial, for the insured is offering information that he would likely have to
admit later during discovery or at trial.
The trickier case for the injured party wishing to apologize is when
the insurance contract specifically forbids the insured from assuming li-
ability absent the insurance company's consent. Would an apology that
admits fault then void the insurance coverage? There are few cases on
this, usually arising from automobile accidents, and the law is not well-
settled.54 Most courts have maintained the insured's coverage, but some
have not.55 At root, the reasoning seems to be that to void the insured's
coverage simply because she apologizes is contrary to public policy. 56 The
purpose of insurance, after all, is to pay for damages when a mishap has
occurred rather than to discourage moral behavior following the mishap.
As one court reasoned:
[Suppose] A is injured by B. A, without thinking of whether or not B is
protected by insurance, says to B, "I think you were at fault." B truth-
fully answers, "Yes, I was at fault." A makes demand on B. B refers the
matter to his insurer. The insurer, after investigating, finds that B was at
fault, but that he has admitted his fault. The insurer, therefore, refuses to
make payment because of B's statement admitting fault. We cannot
bring ourseif [sic] to bring about such a result.57
One distinction courts draw is between statements by the insured that
(truthfully) admit fault and statements that assume (financial) liability.
53. The insured could point to studies indicating that injured parties who receive apologies are
less likely to file suit than those who do not. See supra note 7.
54. See Cohen v. Employers' Iiab. Assurance Corp., 187 F. Supp. 25, 28 (1960), aff'd 289 F.2d
319 (4th Cir. 1961).
55. See Annotation, Validiry, Construction, and Effect of "No-Consent-to-Settlement" Exclu-
sion Clauses in Automobile Insurance Policies, 18 A.L.R. 4th 249, § 4 (1981).
56. Such policies might include encouraging private settlement of disputes or preventing people
from being penalized for making sincere, truthful statements.
57. U-Drive-It Car Co., Inc. v. Friedman, 153 So. 500, 501 (1934) (holding that driver's signed
affidavit admitting fault following car accident did not void insurance coverage despite contract
clauses requiring "that 'the assured shall at all times render to the [insurance] corporation all co-
operation within his power,' and 'shall not voluntarily assume any liability ... without the consent of
the corporation previously given in writing"'). See also id. at 503 ("[T]here is something contrary to
our ideas as to what should be an established public policy for an insurer to require from the assured
that he, the assured, shall not make a statement about the facts of an accident in which he may be in-
volved."). Id. at 504 ("[The] failure to co-operate could not be said to result from the making of a
truthful statement.").
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The latter voids the insured's coverage, but the former does not. Writes
Appleman, "[A] policy provision [against assuming liability] does not
prohibit the insured from giving the injured person a truthful explanation
of the accident and circumstances thereof."5 This seems a sound ap-
proach: Don't bind the insurance company to a financial settlement to
which it has not consented, but don't prevent the insured from telling the
truth either.
I have four final notes: First, the concern that the insured might void
his insurance coverage through an apology should not be overstated. For
example, despite the many medical mistakes that do occur and the many
physicians who do apologize for those mistakes, my research has yielded
no case in which a physician's insurance coverage has been voided on the
basis of her apology. Similarly, car accident cases where insurance cover-
age is contested because the insured apologized are exceedingly rare. Sec-
ond, if the insured party contacts the insurer before apologizing and ob-
tains the insurer's approval, coverage will be maintained. This may be
cumbersome, but where the insured decides to apologize well after the in-
jury, it is not implausible. Third, if the insured apologizes without obtain-
ing the insurer's approval, it is prudent to focus on admitting fault while
steering clear of assuming liability (e.g., expressing a willingness to pay
compensation). As discussed above, this helps to protect the insurance
coverage. Fourth, if offenders refrain from apologizing out of fear of
voiding their insurance coverage, this does not mean that apology has no
role to play. Rather, it is the insurance company that must now think seri-
ously about apology. For example, if many patients would not sue physi-
cians were they to apologize for their mistakes, 59 but physicians who make
mistakes don't apologize for fear that apologizing will jeopardize their in-
surance coverage or otherwise backfire against them,60 a forward-looking
insurance company might do well to encourage physicians to apologize.
Though the insurance company would likely not concern itself with psy-
chology or spiritual benefits that could accrue to the physician from apol-
58. 8 APPLEMAN, supra note 47, at § 4780.
59. See supra Part I.
60. At times, the medical establishment helps foster such fears. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, OFFICE OFTHE GENERAL COUNSEL, DIvIsION OF HEALTH LAW, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY INSURANCE 133 (1998) (including on their "physician's checklist [for] what to do when a
claim or potential claim occurs .... Do not contact the patient.... Avoid all impulses to try to nego-
tiate or discuss the matter with the patient or the patient's family. If an attorney is involved on behalf
of the patient or the patient's family, do not discuss the case with that attorney either, even if you feel
that you did nothing wrong or that your care and treatment were successful. Anything that you say can
and will be held against you. Even mentioning that you are covered by liability insurance could en-
courage a patient to file a claim.").
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ogy, it ought to at least weigh the possible financial benefits (dropping of
suit, reducing legal costs by facilitating settlement, or the like) which an
apology could engender.
4. Liability
Yet it is liability, or the fear of liability, that forms the central barrier
to apology in most disputes. If one apologizes, isn't one admitting that one
is liable? More specifically, can one's apology be used against oneself as
an admission in court? The short answer to these questions is that much
depends upon the context in which one offers the apology. Before attempt-
ing a longer answer, let me make several observations.
For some clients, accepting responsibility, including financial re-
sponsibility, for an injury they caused is a cost they are willing to incur.
For example, Hank may believe that it is his moral responsibility to pay for
Mr. Cleary's broken window and be happy to make amends. Of course,
Hank would rather that he had not broken the window in the first place.
However, given that he broke it, Hank may accept that he should pay to
replace it.
For other clients, accepting responsibility, including financial re-
sponsibility, comes less from a sense of moral obligation than from the
"costlessness" to the client of paying the compensation. For example, the
major tobacco companies may be quite willing to pay a multi-billion dollar
settlement-as indicated by the rise in their stock prices following the an-
nouncement of a proposed settlement-because the companies can readily
pass along that cost to consumers while remaining competitive, for all the
major companies will face that cost, and because reaching any final settle-
ment would remove the ominous cloud of indeterminate liability that inter-
feres with their ability to conduct business.61 Similarly, some clients may
see insurance coverage as insulating the client from the cost of paying
damages. 62
Where one's culpability can readily be proved by independent evi-
dence other than an apology, admitting one's fault when making an apol-
ogy will also have little impact on the plaintiffs ability to prove his case,
61. See Hubert H. Humphrey, I, Don't Let Big Tobacco off the Hook, NEWSDAY (New York),
Apr. 30, 1997, at A41.
62. Hickson et al. relay a noteworthy example of medical malpractice in which a physician
"tipped off' a couple to the physician's own malpractice on the couple's child. "He said that the
[child's] arm would never get any better, but that he had malpractice insurance and that was what it
was for." Hickson, supra note 7, at 1362. One should remember, however, the possible risks to insur-
ance coverage posed by such statements. See supra Part II.C.3.
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for he already can. If a host of eyewitnesses sees the defendant smash his
car into the plaintiff's after running a red light, the plaintiff will be able to
prove the case irrespective of an apology. Similarly, after a settlement is
reached and executed, the offender may risk little by apologizing, but both
sides may have much to gain. A striking example comes from the criminal
setting, where fine work has been done within Victim-Offender Recon-
ciliation Programs (VORP) to reconcile victims and offenders after the
judge's sentence has been given.63 Offenders, already in jail, have little to
lose by apologizing, but they may benefit from decreased feelings of guilt
and the possibility of earlier parole. A parallel approach may also work in
many civil disputes, that is to say, after the parties reach a settlement in-
cluding a total release from liability but not an apology, might the offender
then apologize? 64
These provisos aside, any discussion of the interplay between apology
and liability must recognize that unless care is taken to ensure otherwise,
an apology can be used as evidence of liability. Although courts may be
hesitant to find guilt upon an apology alone, an apology can be used as
evidence against the defendant. 65 Despite the fact an apology would nor-
mally be excluded as hearsay, in a case against the offender, the offender's
apology falls under the exception for admissions by a party opponent.66
The cautions given against apology are not without basis. An
"unprotected" apology can backlash against the offender. If, following an
accident, the offender says to the victim, "I am sorry. It was all my fault. I
regret having injured you," the victim can use that statement against the
offender in court.67 Hence, clients and lawyers may rightly ask whether
there are ways to apologize "safely," such that the apology cannot be used
against the client as proof of liability.6s Put differently, can a client obtain
63. See generally MARK S. UMBREIT, vIcrIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMACT OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994); MARTIN WRIGHT, JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: A
RESTORATVE RESPONSE TO CRIME (1991); LaPrairie, supra note 10. Some VORP programs attempt
reconciliation before legal proceedings have begun. For example, before reaching a decision on
whether to prosecute, a district attorney may refer a case to a VORP with the understanding that if the
victim is satisfied with the outcome of the VORP, the district attorney will not prosecute.
64. See Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE
323 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991) (suggesting that after disputing parties have
reached a settlement, mutually beneficial trades may still be possible).
65. See Rehm & Beatty, supra note 38, at 119-22 (reviewing medical malpractice cases where
apology alone was insufficient to prove fault).
66. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
67. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 10, at 484 (providing a striking example of apologies
and cultural contrast). Before coming to the United States, Japanese executives sometimes take brief
courses to become familiar with American culture. One topic addressed is what to do if you are in an
accident. The answer Don't apologize, for it will just be used to prove your liability. See id.
68. In contrasting Japanese and American approaches to injury, Prof. McKenna states,
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some of the many possible benefits of apology without incurring the cost
of cementing his liability?
One response is to offer a partial apology. For example, an offender
might express sympathy for the injured party's condition, but not admit
fault or express regret for the defendant's actions. Following a car acci-
dent, the offender might visit the injured party in the hospital and state
simply, "I am very sorry that your leg is broken, and I hope that you feel
better soon." While it is remotely possible that such an expression of sym-
pathy could be interpreted as an admission of fault, many, though not all,
cases looking at sympathetic acts following an injury have found such acts
inadmissible as proof of liability.69 One state, Massachusetts, has even
statutorily prohibited such expressions of sympathy from being used as
proof of fault in accident cases.7" Further, most judges and juries are good
at distinguishing between expressions of sympathy and expressions of fault
or regret,71 and may even be favorably disposed toward defendants who
express sympathy.
Yet often partial expressions will be insufficient to satisfy the injured
party, and it is worth looking at the legally most difficult case in which an
injured party will only be satisfied with a full apology. The question re-
mains: Can one apologize fully-admitting fault, expressing regret for
one's action, and expressing sympathy for the injured party's condition-
without cementing one's liability? Put differently, is there a "safe" way to
apologize fully?72
I think that it's pretty clear that because statements made by defendants in American tort ac-
tions can be used as evidence against them at the time of trial, it's a major disincentive for a
defendant to make any type of statement that can even be construed as close to an apology.
International Workshop Discussion: Beyond Compensation: Dealing with Accidents in the 21st Cen-
tury-The Japanese Experience, 15 U. HAW. L REV. 757,761 (1993) [hereinafter International Work-
shop]. See also Rehm & Beatty, supra note 38, at 118 n.28 (citing such routine cases).
69. See Karl H. larsen, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence Showing Payment, or Offer or
Promise of Payment, of Medical, Hospital, and Similar Expenses of Injured Party by Opposing Party,
65 A.LR. 3d 932 (1996) (showing evidence of payment, or an offer or promise of payment, of the
medical, hospital, and similar expenses of a party who has sustained personal injuries is generally not
admissible to establish the payer's liability).
70. See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 23D (1992) provides in part:
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general sense of be-
nevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in an accident and
made to such person or to the family of such person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an
admission of liability in a civil action.
71. See Rehm & Beatty, supra note 38, at 129 (concluding from a review of case law that,
"[J]udges and juries understand that expression of sympathy, regret, remorseand apology are not nec-
essarily admissions of responsibility or liability.").
72. I later argue that often there are ways for clients to apologize "safely," such that one's apol-
ogy cannot be used against one as proof of liability. Note, however, that a certain relational risk may
attach to an offender who first apologizes "safely," and then seeks to exclude that apology at trial. "If
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D. "SAFE" APOLOGY
1. The Legal Tension
The central legal tension in seeking to apologize "safely" is an evi-
dentiary one. The law has two competing goals. On the one hand, courts
want to admit all probative evidence, and what could be more probative
than a party's own admission of fault? On the other hand, courts want to
encourage private settlement, and what could be a greater impediment to
private settlement than the fear that if one offers words of apology they
will be turned against one to prove one's guilt?7 3 As Wagatsuma and Ro-
sett explain:
[T]he law of evidence in America is torn between the pull to encourage
compromise settlement of disputes by a process that is likely to include
an apology and the countervailing attraction to a common lawyer of an
admission, that "queen of proof," which can be used to prove the claim
despite the hearsay rule and other artificial strictures that make proof at
common law so complex.
74
In American law, three main avenues exist to protect a client who
makes an apology before or at the time of litigation from having that apol-
ogy used against him: rules of evidence, mediation, and confidentiality
agreements. As I shall describe below, none of these methods provides a
perfectly safe protection. However, mediation often offers a useful and
very safe space for making an apology. By contrast, rules of evidence and
confidentiality agreements provide weaker, though different, protection.
you said you were sorry before, why are you denying that now at trial?" an injured party might ask. By
later seeking to exclude a "safe" apology, an offender does risk offending the injured party. However,
as I argue in Part V.B infra, this is not an inevitable response, for offenders offering apologies which
they do not want used against them are in a morally intelligible position. Further, if despite the "safe"
apology, the parties are nevertheless unable to reach an agreement and proceed to trial, their relation-
ship at that point will likely be quite antagonistic irrespective of the offender's effort to exclude the
"safe" apology.
73. This tension is by no means limited to apologies. Consider the basic evidentiary question of
whether settlement offers should be admissible as proof of liability. On the one hand, many, though
not all, parties who make offers of settlement believe that they are at fault, for if they believed they
were innocent, they would be less likely to have made a settlement offer. On the other hand, if settle-
ment offers were admissible to prove liability, very few settlement offers would be made. The law has
consistently seen the second need as more compelling and found settlement offers inadmissible. See
FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note; Fred S. Hjelmeset, Impeachment of Party by Prior In-
consistent Statement in Compromise Negotiations: Admissibility Under Federal Rule of Evidence 408,
43 CLEv. ST. L REV. 75, 86-87 (1995); 2 MCCORMICK, ON EVIDENCE §§ 76, 251 (4th ed. 1992); 23
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, FED. PRAc. & PROC.: EVID. § 5301 (1980); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1061
(Chadboum rev. 1972).
74. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 10, at 479.
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For litigation that is already well under way, protective judicial orders
provide a fourth avenue for "safe" apology, and I will discuss this option
briefly.75
Before beginning, it is worth noting that when asking whether a party
can apologize "safely," it is important to ask, safe from what? The para-
digmatic example is whether an injured party-plaintiff can use an apology
by the offender-defendant against the offender-defendant in subsequent
litigation as proof of fault. However, there are many other ways in which
an apology could be used against an offender-defendant. For example, if
the plaintiff cannot use the apology in court to prove fault, could it be used
in court to prove something other than fault, such as to impeach the defen-
dant if the defendant were later to deny fault? Could it be revealed to the
public-at-large? What if a third party, such as a co-plaintiff or a co-
defendant, wanted to make use of the defendant's apology? Could the
third party introduce the apology to prove the defendant's fault? Below, I
focus on the simple, paradigmatic case; however, practitioners should bear
in mind complications of the kind noted.
Relatedly, when discussing topics like settlement negotiations, me-
diation, confidentiality agreements, and judicial orders, it is common to
use terms such as "privilege" and "confidential" loosely. However, a
proper understanding of these topics requires asking precise questions,
such as who holds the privilege, against whom can it be asserted, and what
is its scope. We may describe mediation as "confidential," but confiden-
tiality can mean different things. Does confidentiality mean that both the
parties and the mediator are forbidden to reveal the contents of the media-
tion, or simply that the mediator is forbidden to reveal them? What would
happen if fraud were to occur during the mediation-would the contents of
the mediation still remain confidential? Lawyers who discuss apology
with a client must be careful in analyzing the specifics of their case and the
applicable legal rules.
2. Rules of Evidence
Rules of evidence that create evidentiary exclusions for statements
made during settlement negotiations provide an important avenue for ex-
cluding an apology at trial. However, it is an avenue with many potholes.
Such rules vary by jurisdiction, and for simplicity I will analyze here only
75. For an excellent overview of these four methods, see Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confi-
dentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGs U. 955 (1988).
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Federal Rule of Evidence 408 ("F.R.E. 408") as it illustrates many of the
essential tensions.
76
The easiest way to understand both F.R.E. 408 and its limitations is to
begin with the common law rules that it superseded.77 Under the common
law, statements made in the course of settlement negotiations were admis-
sible in court unless they were made in hypothetical form ("Let's assume,
solely for the sake of argument, that the defendant were to admit that he
was responsible for .... "), preceded by prophylactic buzz-words "without
prejudice" ("Without prejudice to any of his rights, the defendant admits
that his car crashed into the plaintiff's car ... ."), or so intertwined with an
offer of settlement as to be inseparable from it.
78
The difficulties with these common law rules were several. As noted
by the F.R.E. 408 Advisory Committee:
An inevitable effect [of these common law rules] is to inhibit freedom of
communication with respect to compromise, even among lawyers. An-
other effect is the generation of controversy over whether a given state-
ment falls within or without the protected area .... Further, [rules like
those which would act] by protecting hypothetically phrased state-
ments... constituted a preference for the sophisticated, and a trap for the
unwary.79
Under the common law rules, to protect oneself from having one's
statement made in settlement negotiations from being used against one in
court, one had to invoke legal formalisms, and even then the risk remained
that the statement would be found independent of the settlement offer and
hence unprotected.
F.R.E. 408 sought to change this.80 Instead of using the benchmark
that statements made in settlement negotiations were admissible unless le-
76. While many states have rules of evidence quite similar to F.R.E. 408, practitioners are ad-
vised that state rules vary and that they should be aware of the particular applicable statutes.
77. On F.R.E. 408 generally, see WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 5308; MCCORMICK,
supra note 73, § 266; WIGMORE, supra note 73, § 1061. For a discussion of the common law backdrop
of F.R.E. 408, see George M. Bell, Admissions Arising out of Compromise-Are They Irrelevant?, 31
TEX. L. REV. 239 (1953).
78. See FED. R. EviD. 408 advisory committee's note. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 73, §
251, at 540-41.
79. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
80. The rule states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise
a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability
for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in com-
promise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of com-
promise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered
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gal formalisms were invoked, F.R.E. 408 sought to set the benchmark that
settlement negotiations were inadmissible, with or without such legal for-
malisms, and make the law follow human practice rather than the con-
verse.
81
The purpose of F.R.E. 408 was straightforward: Create a protected
space so as to encourage private settlements. As the F.R.E. 408 Advisory
Committee explained, "The purpose of this rule is to encourage private
settlements which would be discouraged if such evidence were admissi-
ble."82 However, in many respects, F.R.E. 408 has fallen short of this goal.
The limitations of F.R.E. 408 are several, and, as many commentators have
noted, they are significant.8 3 Let me point out a few of the main ones.
The first sentence of F.R.E. 408 states that evidence is inadmissible
under the rule only when used, "to prove liability for or the invalidity of
the claim or its amount." But could the same evidence be admissible for
other purposes? The answer is clearly yes. The last sentence of the rule
expressly provides that evidence may be "offered for another purpose, such
as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a contention of undue
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or proceed-
ing.,,&4 Some courts have found that such evidence is admissible to im-
peach a witness. This loophole may de facto swallow the rule. For exam-
for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negating a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
(emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 408.
81. Note that a settlement offer made following a served claim is inadmissible under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 68 ("An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is
not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs") and analogous state provisions. However,
such rules cover only the settlement offer itself and may not protect conduct or statements made during
settlement negotiations. See Brazil, supra note 75, at 1022-23 ("Since neither rule 68 nor [the appli-
cable state provision] purports to extend protection to evidence of 'conduct or statements made in the
course of compromise negotiations' counsel cannot be sure to what extent these rules of procedure can
be invoked to protect communications that accompany and explain protected offers."). Hence, an
apology offered in conjunction with an offer of settlement may well fall outside of the scope of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 68.
82. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
83. See Brazil, supra note 75; Hjelmeset, supra note 73, at 75; Lawrence R. Freedman & Mi-
chael L Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL
37, 40 (1986); Christopher H. Macturk, Note, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Best Protection Has
Exceptions, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVO. 419, 441 (1995); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation,
98 HARV. L REV. 441,449 (1984); Jon R. Waltz & J. Patrick Huston, The Rules of Evidence in Set-
tlement, 5 LITIGATION 1, 11-15 (1978).
84. This is not to say that such evidence would not have to clear hurdles such as FED. R. EVD.
403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.. .") or that strict limiting instructions could not be given by the
judge concerning the use of that evidence. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 5315, at 292-93;
MCCORMICK, supra note 73, § 59.
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pie, if a defendant who admitted his guilt when apologizing during settle-
ment negotiations were later to deny his guilt at trial, the earlier admission
likely could be used against him for impeachment.85 Accordingly, if a goal
of F.R.E. 408 is to provide parties with enough certainty that their state-
ments will be inadmissible at trial so that they feel free to speak uninhibit-
edly, F.R.E. 408 fails in this goal.
Second, even if F.R.E. 408 were to bar an apology made during set-
tlement negotiations from admission at trial, F.R.E. 408 does not preclude
such evidence from pre-trial discovery, nor does it prevent such evidence
from being revealed to third parties. Such loopholes can be significant
deterrents to making an apology. For example, if in the course of settle-
ment negotiations President Clinton offered Paula Jones a full apology,
F.R.E. 408 might stop Jones from introducing it at trial, but it would not
stop her from revealing the apology to the world. This issue can be par-
ticularly tricky when there are multiple plaintiffs or defendants,8 6 or when
there are both civil and criminal charges.8 7
Third, F.R.E. 408 only protects conduct or statements made "in com-
promise negotiations," and in some cases there may be a question as to
whether "compromise negotiations" have begun. Put differently, how de-
veloped must the dispute be before the protections afforded by F.R.E. 408
attach? 8 Once a legal claim has been filed, F.R.E. 408 will clearly apply,
but before a claim has been filed, it may be unclear whether a statement
was made in the course of compromise negotiations. 89 Often an offender
will want to apologize immediately after the injury; however, F.R.E. 408
may not cover such an apology.
Some may ask whether the common law protections have any value
following the adoption of F.R.E. 408. For example, is there benefit to be
had from invoking the prophylactic buzz-words "without prejudice" before
making an apology or other statements in settlement negotiations? 90 The
85. See Hjelmeset, supra note 73, at 109 (describing impeachment by prior inconsistent state-
ment as the "vacuum" that puts the entire rule in jeopardy). See also Brazil, supra note 75, at 966-67,
975 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 73, § 5302, at 227) ("Admission of statements merely be-
cause they are inconsistent with the trial testimony threatens to reduce 'the second sentence of Rule
408 to a cipher."').
86. See Carney v. Santa Cruz Women Against Rape, 271 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1990) (holding letter of
apology admissible to prove liability of third party, not the writer).
87. See United States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74, 78 (1984) (holding defendant's offer to com-
promise in civil suit admissible against defendant in criminal case).
88. See McCORMIcK, supra note 73, at § 266; Brazil, supra note 75, at 963.
89. See Brazil, supra note 75, at 963.
90. One might ask an analogous question of what remains of the common law trick of phrasing
statements in hypothetical form since the adoption of F.R.E. 408. As hypothetical statements by nature
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answer seems to be both no and yes. While the case law is scant, it would
appear that, in seeking to expand the common law protections, F.R.E. 408
also superseded them, for the F.R.E. 408 Advisory Committee criticized
the rationales behind the common law rules. 91 However, prefacing a
statement with the invocation "without prejudice" may be strong evidence
that the speaker intended the statement to be part of compromise negotia-
tions, and the statement may be so interpreted by courts. 92 Accordingly,
invoking the phrase "without prejudice" may help make a statement
"safer," but it should not be taken as one hundred percent effective, and
one should not be lulled into a false sense of security by doing so. Simi-
larly, making an explicit reference to F.R.E. 408 before making an apology
(for instance, writing at the top of a letter of apology that it is, "a confi-
dential communication protected by F.R.E. 408") may help to persuade a
court that the letter is inadmissible to prove fault, but it will not be dis-
positive.
3. In Mediation
Mediation offers a second possible avenue toward a "safe" apology,
and here the protection is much stronger.93 As mediation confidentiality
have little to no probative value, a hypothetically phrased apology should still be effective at preventing
its introduction into evidence. Yet a hypothetically phrased apology ("assuming, solely for the sake of
argument, that I were to admit that I was at fault") has a severe drawback: It may carry little meaning to
the recipient. At times hypothetical phrasing may be useful in "sounding out" whether an injured party
would be receptive toward receiving an apology, and what, if any, response an apology might effect in
the injured party's behavior.
91. See Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (1984), aff'd762 F.2d 990.
92. See supra note 90, and infra note 93 and accompanying text.
93. On confidentiality protections for statements made during mediation, see Note, Protecting
Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 83; Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privi-
lege, 2 OmO ST. J. ON DimS. RESOL 1 (1986); Freedman & Prigoff, supra note 83; Karen L. Liepmann,
Confidentiality in Environmental Mediation: Should Third Parties Have Access to the Process?, 14
B.C. ENVTL AFF. L REV. 93 (1986); Macturk, supra note 83; Brazil, supra note 75, at 1023; Philip J.
Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Me-
diator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L REv. 315 (1989); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred
Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEIPP. L REV. S5 (1989); Robert B. McKay, Ethical Considerations
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45 ARB. J. 15 (1990); Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on
Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 157
(1994); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transition from Theory to Implementation: Designing
a Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Inter-
est, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 1; James M. Assey, Jr., Mum's the Word on Mediation: Confidentiality and
Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 9 GEORGETOWN J. LEG. ETHICS 991 (1996); Pamela A. Kentra,
Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between
the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct,
1997 BYU L. REV. 715.
Parallel to this essay's question of whether lawyers should discuss apology with clients is the
question of whether mediators should discuss apology with parties, and, if so, how. For example, is a
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provisions are created by state statutes and court rules, they vary widely; 94
however, where they do afford protection, often the protection they afford
is quite strong.95 Accordingly, lawyers must know the particular mediation
statute applicable in a case. As most lawyers are repeat players in one lo-
cale, this should not be burdensome.
Indeed, some commentators have criticized these protections as being
too strong, and prone to abuses such as fraud or coercion. 96 While such
confidentiality provisions may occasionally come into conflict with other
provisions (such as the Freedom of Information Act in environmental me-
diation cases where the government plays a role) 97 or face conflict of laws
challenges (as to whether one jurisdiction will honor another jurisdiction's
mediator better off raising apology in a joint session (so all is "out in the open") or in a private caucus
(so as to avoid putting a party "on the spot')? On the importance of apology within mediation, see
generally Levi, supra note 29, at 1165.
94. See Kentra, supra note 93, at 733 (reviewing mediation confidentiality statutes state by
state). Writes Kentra, "[Nlearly every jurisdiction in the United States has different statutes or local
court rules establishing the parameters of the particular mediation programs .... As a result, confiden-
tiality policies differ significantly from one program to another and from one jurisdiction to another."
Id. at 724-25. See also Macturk, supra note 83, at 423.
95. Though they vary by state, the statutory protections afforded mediation are often quite
strong. In Nebraska, for example,
[n]o records, notes, or other documentation, written or electronic, of the mediation process,
except the contents of a final agreement between the parties, shall be examined in any judi-
cial or administrative proceeding. Any communications made confidential by the act which
become subject to judicial or administrative process requiring the disclosure of such com-
munications shall not be disclosed.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2908 (1997). The Washington law states that
[a]ll memoranda, work notes or products, or case files of [mediation] centers established un-
der this chapter are confidential and privileged and are not subject to disclosure in any judi-
cial or administrative proceeding unless the court or administrative tribunal determines that
the materials were submitted by a participant to the center for the purpose of avoiding dis-
covery of the material in a subsequent proceeding. Any communication relating to the sub-
ject matter of the resolution made during the resolution process by any participant, mediator,
or any other person is a privileged communication and is not subject to disclosure in any ju-
dicial or administrative proceeding unless all parties to the communication waive the privi-
lege. The foregoing privilege and limitation on evidentiary use does not apply to any com-
munication of a threat that injury or damage may be inflicted on any person or on the
property of a party to the dispute, to the extent the communication may be relevant evidence
in a criminal matter.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.75.050 (West 1997).
Some commentators have suggested that the work-product doctrine, as developed in Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) and codified in FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3), might offer protection for a law-
yer-mediator seeking to keep her mediations confidential. However, it seems unlikely that such an ar-
gument will carry much force. See Feinberg, supra note 93, at S36-37; Harter, supra note 93, at 332.
Even were this doctrine to apply, the confidentiality privilege would rest with the lawyer-mediator, and
not the parties.
96. See Green, supra note 93; Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 83, at
453 ("[By being overbroad], the new [mediation confidentiality] statutes may detract from the very
climate of truthfulness that confidentiality should foster.").
97. See Harter, supra note 93, at 335-40; Liepmann, supra note 93.
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mediation confidentiality rules) 98 or Supremacy Clause challenges (such
as, will Federal agency's subpoena override a state confidentiality stat-
ute),99 absent extreme circumstances, such confidentiality statutes are rou-
tinely upheld. Writes Pamela Kentra, "Legislatively created mediation
privileges ... provide comprehensive confidentiality protection to the me-
diation process. Courts have generally upheld such statutes in litiga-
tion." 10 Hence, mediation often provides a legally protected space for
making a "safe" apology. 10
Mediation is also a natural place for apology, for a main goal of me-
diation is to help the parties work out their differences. Apologies often do
take place in mediation. 102 Not only are many mediators experienced at
fostering apologies, but making an apology during mediation may fit well
with the expectations the parties bring to the mediation process. Further,
many types of disputes (family, employment, neighborhood, and the like)
are commonly mediated, making mediation a feasible option in many
cases.
However, mediation is not without some drawbacks. First, not all ju-
risdictions have strong mediation confidentiality statutes, which makes
mediation an avenue available to some, not all. 3 Second, parties typically
go to mediation only after the dispute has escalated, but, from a relational
viewpoint, making an apology very soon after the injury may be most help-
ful. Though an apology at a late stage can at times transform a seemingly
intractable dispute, one would generally think that the earlier the apology
is made, the better. While in some cases very early mediation is provided
for institutionally, as in doctor-patient disputes before a hospital mediation
98. See Rosenberg, supra note 93 (arguing for creating a uniform mediation privilege on federal
and state levels because of conflict of laws concerns). Conflict of laws concerns become most relevant
where the parties have some choice over the forum.
99. Compare United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (government's showing
inadequate for grand jury subpoena to overcome state ADR confidentiality law), and In re March
1994-Special Grand Jury, 897 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (grand jury subpoena overrode media-
tion confidentiality privilege created by state law). See also David Hoffman, Protecting Confidential-
ity in Mediation, MASS. LAW. WKLY, April 17, 1995, at SB2.
100. Kentra, supra note 93, at 729.
101. For an excellent review of possible challenges to mediation confidentiality in one state
(Massachusetts), see Hoffman, supra note 99.
102. See Levi, supra note 29 (discussing the frequent use of apology in mediation). Mediator
David Hoffman reported to me that the tactic of using mediation to make a "safe" apology is used by
some. For example, one defense attorney begins most mediations of meritorious employment disputes
before Hoffman by offering an apology from the employer corporation (but not necessarily the individ-
ual offender) to the employee. No doubt the "safety" afforded by mediation is critical to this.
103. Note, however, the possible use of protective judicial orders in conjunction with mediation
discussed infra Part lJ.D.5.
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board, or contractually, as in some labor disputes, in many cases, media-
tion occurs well after the injury. An offender wanting to apologize "early
on" could request that the injured party accompany her to mediation.
However, this might strike the injured party as unusual, especially if the
injured party has not yet brought a claim. Third, not all cases are well-
suited to mediation,1°4 and for some disputes neither of the parties may see
mediation as a plausible option. 105
4. By Contract
Confidentiality agreements, which are often used in conjunction with
mediation, provide a third avenue for making a "safe" apology. 10 6 This
avenue has both strengths and weaknesses. A main strength is that, unlike
the statutory protections for settlement negotiations and mediations which
typically address whether statements will be admissible in court, confiden-
tiality agreements allow parties to limit more broadly the uses of state-
ments. For example, if an offender is concerned that the injured party not
reveal the offender's apology to the public or to other co-plaintiffs (topics
neither F.R.E. 408 nor mediation statutes may cover), a confidentiality
agreement can provide penalties for such actions. As a contract, a confi-
dentiality agreement can be tailored to address such diverse concerns.
Yet confidentiality agreements have weaknesses, and for a party
wishing to make a "safe" apology inadmissible in court, one weakness is
particularly severe. Courts usually disregard clauses within confidentiality
agreements that purport to preclude a court from hearing evidence as being
contrary to public policy. What right, after all, do two private parties have
to write a contract that precludes a court from hearing evidence? None,
most courts reason. Hence, one should not be lulled into a false sense of
security by a confidentiality agreement. While courts may occasionally
show sympathy toward a party seeking to rely upon such an agreement to
exclude evidence, on the whole they do not.107
104. See Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. L 49 (1994).
105. For cases where free mediation services are unavailable, there is also the issue of the media-
tor's fee. Though meager relative to the costs of protracted litigation, paying this fee may present a
tricky issue. If the offender wants to apologize "early on"--say before the injured party has even ap-
proached the offender about compensation-it might strike the injured party as odd to split that fee, for
it may seem odd to be going to mediation in the first place. Yet, were the offender to offer to pay the
whole of the mediator's fee, that could cast doubt on the mediator's neutrality. All that said, paying for
the mediation is a minor issue, unlikely to pose a significant obstacle in most cases.
106. See KENNErH CLOKE, MEDIATION: REvENGE AND THE MAGIC OF FORGrVENEsS 169 (2d ed.
1994) (providing an illustrative pre-mediation agreement).
107. See Note Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 83, at 451; Brazil, supra note
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Nevertheless, confidentiality agreements may still provide some
benefit for parties wishing to exclude evidence from a court's purview.
Similar to how, after the adoption of F.R.E. 408, a court might look at the
common law invocation "without prejudice" as evidence that statements
made following that invocation were in the course of compromise negotia-
tions (and thereby excludable under F.R.E. 408, but not the common law),
a court can look to a confidentiality agreement as evidence that statements
made following that agreement were in the course of settlement negotia-
tions, and thus protected under F.R.E. 408. However, it must be recog-
nized that F.R.E. 408 offers only limited protection.
5. By Judicial Order
Once litigation is well under way, judicial orders provide a fourth
potential avenue for "safe" apology. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)
provides that a court may, "for good cause shown... make any order
which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Courts can order
statements made in settlement negotiations, like an apology, to be kept
confidential.10 8 Possible uses of such orders include preventing the disclo-
sure of mediation proceedings or settlement negotiations, or the revelation
of the settlement agreement reached. 1°9 An advantage of such an order is
the judge's ability to tailor it to parties' specific needs. Another advantage
of an order is the weight of judicial force: A party who would not fear
breaking a private confidentiality agreement may well fear violating a ju-
dicial order.
As a vehicle for "safe" apology, however, judicial orders have several
drawbacks. First, obtaining a judicial order, if it comes at all, usually
comes quite "late in the game," after litigation is well under way. Second,
obtaining a judicial order can be difficult. Unlike the protections afforded
by F.R.E. 408, mediation, or confidentiality agreements which the parties
may invoke themselves, a judicial order requires a judge's approval, and
judges may be hesitant to grant that approval. Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
75, at 1026; STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, FRANK E.A. SANDER & NANCY ROGERS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 180 (1992); Macturk, supra note 83, at 417-18.
108. See Richard J. Vangelisti, Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)
Concerning Protective Orders: A Critical Analysis of What It Means and How It Operates, 48
BAYLOR L. REV. 163, 164-65 (1996) ("Courts enter protective orders to protect parties... from [inter
alia] ... disclosure of highly personal or private information. Courts exercise broad discretion in de-
termining whether to issue protective orders, and courts routinely enter protective orders when parties
agree that an order is necessary to facilitate their litigation.").
109. See Brazil, supra note 75, at 1011; Assey, supra note 93, at 997.
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cedure 26(c) provides that a judge has discretion to grant a protective order
"for good cause shown." However, generally speaking, "in interpreting
this rule courts have not considered the public policy behind the rule to be
the promotion of settlements."' 10 Accordingly, arguing that one needs a
protective order so as to make a "safe" apology may be a difficult road.
Third, courts have the power to modify their orders and allow disclosure in
later proceedings, raising the specter that what one had hoped would be a
confidential communication will not remain so.
1 11
Despite these drawbacks, protective orders are a noteworthy option in
an important set of cases.112 In jurisdictions in which mediation confiden-
tiality statutes provide minimal protection, upon the request of the parties
to enter mediation, a judge could issue an order providing strong confiden-
tiality protection for the mediation proceedings.
6. Overlapping Protection
Parties can use different legal devices in an overlapping manner to
make a "safe" apology "safer." For example, a party seeking to apologize
might do so during a mediation preceded by a confidentiality agreement
which states that all statements made during the mediation are part of
F.R.E. 408 settlement negotiations between the parties and made without
prejudice to any of the parties' rights. Such an agreement might also pro-
vide for penalties for revealing the contents of the mediation to a third
party.
7. Summary
Under the existing law, it is often possible for a client to make a
"safe" apology that fully admits fault. Generally speaking, mediation of-
fers the "safest" and most practical way to do this. Rules of evidence,
confidentiality agreements, and protective judicial orders (especially in ju-
risdictions with weak mediation confidentiality statutes) can also be impor-
tant devices in many cases, and can be used in conjunction with mediation.
110. Assey, supra note 93, at 996 [emphasis added]. See also McKay, supra note 93, at 26.
111. See Feinberg, supra note 93, at S37. See also Kentra, supra note 93, at 732 n.76. Kentra
states:
Parties may later seek to have the protective order modified or challenge the validity of a
protective order. Courts would ordinarily require the moving party to show that the order was
improvidently granted or to demonstrate a compelling need for the information .... Parties
and their attorneys can increase the chance that orders will be upheld if they are certain to
include an acceptable justification for the order in the body of the order and restrict its scope
to those materials for which the order is justified.
Id.
112. I thank David Hoffman for this suggestion.
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Practitioners must be aware of the particular statutes which apply to their
case as statutes, especially mediation confidentiality statutes, vary widely
among jurisdictions.
E. REASONS LAWYERS NEGLECr APOLOGY
If apology has so much to offer and the risks of apology can often be
minimized, why don't lawyers discuss apology with clients more than they
do? Let me -suggest several reasons, beginning with the benign and work-
ing toward the not-so-benign.
1. Don't Think of It
Many lawyers simply may not think of discussing apology with cli-
ents. This may come in part from legal training. In my three years in law
school, apology was hardly ever discussed. 113 The legal system focuses on
adjudicating rights, rather than on repairing relationships. An apology is
not a legal remedy one can seek in an American court.114 As such, many
lawyers may never consider it.
2. Unaware "Safe" Apology Exists
Many lawyers do not realize that there are legally "safe" ways to
apologize. While lawyers may know that a "bald" apology can be used
against one's client as an admission of liability, they may not know that
"safe" avenues for making an apology exist.
113. A teaching experience of Professor Kenny Hegland conveys this well:
In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various doctrines we had recently studied.
I put the following:
In a long-term installment contract, seller promises buyer to deliver widgets at the rate of
1,000 a month. The first two deliveries are perfect. However, in the third month seller
delivers only 990 widgets. Buyer becomes so incensed that he rejects delivery and re-
fuses to pay for the widgets already delivered.
After stating the problem, I asked, "If you were Seller, what would you say?" What I was
looking for was a discussion of the various common law theories which would force the
buyer to pay for the widgets delivered and those which would throw buyer into breach for
canceling the remaining deliveries. In short, I wanted the class to come up with the legal
doctrines which would allow Seller to crush Buyer.
After asking the question, I looked around the room for a volunteer. As is so often the case
with first year students, I found there were... [none]. There was, however, one eager face,
that of an eight-year-old son of one of my students. It seems that he was suffering through
Contracts due to his mother's sin of failing to find a sitter. Suddenly he raised his hand.
Such behavior, even from an eight-year-old, must be rewarded.
"OK," I said, "What would you say if you were the seller?"
"I'd say, 'I'm sorry."'
Kenny Hegland, Why Teach Trial Advocacy? An Essay on Never Ask Why, in HUMANISTIC EDu-
CATION IN LAW (J. Himmelstein & H. Lesnick eds., 1982).
114. See supra notes 17 &25.
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3. Appearance of Disloyalty
Lawyers may fear that if they raise the topic of apology with a client-
offender, the client will think the lawyer disloyal, too sympathetic to the
other party's case.115 No doubt many alleged offenders will feel uneasy
when the subject of apology is first raised. Accordingly, before discussing
apology with a client, the lawyer needs to build a good enough relationship
with the client so that the client will understand that, when the lawyer
raises the possibility of apology, the lawyer is acting in the client's best
interest. As is often the case, discussing subjects that are difficult for the
client to hear (e.g., reality checking) is an important part of good lawyer-
ing.
4. Role Expectations
Discussing apology may run counter to the role expectations which
both lawyers and clients bring to their relationship. "If I wanted someone
to tell me to apologize," says the client, "I would have gone to my minister,
not my lawyer. What I want from you is to help me win." This logic can
be self-fulfilling. A lawyer may think, "I don't talk with my clients about
apology, because lawyers don't do that with clients," and a client may
think similarly. However, I see no good reason to think that lawyers and
clients, or at least some lawyers and some clients, cannot have different
role expectations which would include the lawyer discussing apology.
5. It's Too Late
Lawyers, and many clients as well, may think that by the time a client
comes to the lawyer, it's too late for an apology to do much good. Once
the other side has threatened or begun to sue, what good will an apology
do? If the relationship between the parties has already turned so hostile, is
apology a moot issue? I think not.
First, often offenders approach lawyers quite soon after an injury.
Second, even when an offender comes to a lawyer well after the injury,
apology can still play an important role. Social psychologists have shown
that parties tend to view their adversaries as more extreme and unreason-
able than they actually are.116 "He'll never accept my apology," the client
115. Relatedly, some lawyers may fear looking self-righteous or paternalistic toward their clients
if they initiate conversations about apology.
116. See LEE Ross & ANDREw WARD, NAIVE REALISM IN EVERYDAY LIFE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOCIAL CONFICT AND MISUNDERSTANDING (Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation Working
Paper No. 48, 1995). See also Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Im-
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might say, "so why should I do it?" In actuality, one's adversary is often
more flexible than one thinks, so that, even when one is highly skeptical
that an apology will "do any good," it often does.
Many practitioners report that apologies often work "magic" or
"miracles"117--that an apology creates a sudden thaw in what had previ-
ously been an icy, apparently intractable dispute." 8 The psychological dy-
namic of misperceiving one's adversary may help explain why apology
often seems magical in its ability to transform apparently intractable dis-
putes and why an apology may be more efficacious than a party or his law-
yer may expect. It is hard to think of many cases where an offender says,
"I would like to apologize," and the injured party is unwilling to listen. In-
deed, often an apology triggers like conduct from the recipient.
6. "Macho" Lawyering
Many lawyers like to act "macho." "We don't apologize, we defeat
our adversaries in courtroom battle." Apology runs counter to this ethos.
Apology requires humility, and if one lacks the humility to admit that one
made a mistake, one cannot apologize. Accordingly, to discuss apology
with a client, a "macho" lawyer will need to break out of that mind set and
be capable of envisioning how an apology could be made. 119
7. Loss Aversion
Loss aversion may also lead clients not to apologize. 120 When faced
with the choice between taking (i) a certain, but small, loss or (ii) a gamble
with a chance of a very large loss and a chance of no loss, many people
choose the gamble. An apology is similar to a certain, but small, loss-it
requires that the offender take an immediate, humbling step. Many people
would rather gamble than take a certain loss, and may hence avoid apol-
ogy.
passe: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997).
117. See Cloke, supra note 31; Goldberg, Green & Sander, supra note 4, at 221.
118. Ross and Ward's naive realism provides a helpful way to understand why those "miracles"
are to some degree expected. See Ross & WARD, supra note 116. See also SCHEFF, supra note 23, at
134-35 (arguing that the surfacing of shame is the key to the transformative power of apology).
119. See infra Part IIIB. See also Goldberg et al., supra note 4, at 223 (offering a sample apol-
ogy of what President Reagan might have said following the Iran-Contra affair).
120. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
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8. Pattern of Denial
A pattern of denial often takes hold early in the course of litigation,
and once begun, it may generate a momentum of its own. Faced with a
claim, a defendant's answers are typically due quickly, say, within twenty
days. Such answers almost invariably deny any wrongdoing, the logic be-
ing that one can always concede a point of liability later, but having con-
ceded it, one cannot "take it back." Further, claims frequently use inflated
and highly antagonistic rhetoric. Accordingly, a denial-oriented mind set
may develop at the start of many legal disputes, and apology may be no-
where to be seen.
9. Divergent Interests
Divergent interests between lawyers and clients, frequently given the
economic label of "principal-agent" problems,12 1 may also play an impor-
tant part in lawyers' neglect of apology.122 Consider a plaintiffs lawyer
hired on a one-third, contingency-fee basis. A million dollar settlement or
jury award earns such a lawyer a fee of over three hundred thousand dol-
lars, but an apology, which could be worth just as much to the client, may
earn the same lawyer nothing. 123 Indeed, to the extent that the apology re-
duces the level of the financial settlement, plaintiffs' lawyers have an in-
centive to avoid it. If lawyers could monetize the value of an apology and
take a cut of it, I expect that we would see many more apologies occurring
in legal disputes. 124
121. See generally PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCrURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
122. Insurance companies also have quite divergent interests from clients when it comes to apol-
ogy. If the insurance company is to pay the damages, the insurance company may have a strong inter-
est that the client not apologize. By contrast, knowing that she has insurance, the client may feel much
freer to apologize.
123. The break between Paula Jones and her first set of attorneys in her sexual harassment suit
against President Clinton illustrates this tension well. Apparently, Jones' first set of lawyers believed
they could get a large financial settlement for Jones of approximately $700,000, in essence the money
she sought, but without an admission of fault from Clinton. Jones insisted that she wanted a full apol-
ogy from Clinton, including an admission of fault. At that point the first set of lawyers resigned. See,
e.g., David G. Savage & Robert L Jackson, Paula Jones's Lawyers Quit, Citing Disagreement, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 9, 1997, at A7. Clinton eventually settled with Jones for $850,000 but no apology. See
also Lewis, supra note 44.
124. To extend this argument to defense lawyers-generally paid by the hour rather than by con-
tingency fee-one needs a richer account. Two possibilities might be that (i) many lawyers "play both
sides of the fence," at times representing plaintiffs and at other times defendants, and do well on the
whole by neglecting apology, and (ii) that the defendant's lawyer knows that the plaintiff's lawyer will
not be interested in an apology, so he is less inclined to raise that possibility.
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Lawyers derive much income from creating and maintaining litiga-
tion. Lawyers generally benefit when disputes escalate. Apologies help
bring disputes to an end, and in so doing limit the lawyers' fees.' 25 A de-
fendant's lawyer might fail to counsel a client to apologize, for, if an apol-
ogy occurred, that attorney's hourly fees could end. I am reminded of a
joke a senior associate in a Boston law firmn once told me. "Our good cli-
ents call us before they decide what to do, asking for advice on how to
avoid violating the law. Our best clients call us after they have done
something wrong." I do not mean to suggest that many lawyers con-
sciously reject the option of advising a client to apologize from self-
interest; however, some lawyers may, consistent with their self-interest,
passively neglect to discuss that option.
Lawyers also have their reputations to consider. A lawyer who rec-
ommends apology to clients may come to be known as a "softie," while a
lawyer may benefit from having a reputation for being good at playing
"hardball." Clients' reputational interests can be quite different. As most
clients are involved in far fewer disputes than most lawyers, a client may
be much less afraid of gaining a reputation for being a "softie." Some cli-
ents may enjoy it. For example, a business may want its customers to feel
that if they have any complaints, the business will respond sensitively.
The fear of committing legal malpractice may also stop some lawyers
from counseling apology. From the viewpoint of legal malpractice, a
worst-case scenario is when a lawyer gives a client a specific piece of legal
advice, the client relies on it, the advice turns out to be wrong, and the cli-
ent incurs a whopping liability. A lawyer who is thinking about counseling
a client to make a "safe" apology may fear just this scenario. For example,
if the lawyer tells the client that it's "safe" to make an apology which
admits fault during the course of mediation, and the client does so, but it
later turns out that the client's apology is admissible in court, the lawyer
will be in an awkward position indeed. 126
125. Some lawyers may earn potentially profitable reputations for helping to prevent extensive
litigation, sacrificing fees on a particular client with the hope that an enhanced reputation will bring in
other clients.
126. Each of these "principal-agent" problems whereby an attorney acts in her own best interest
rather than the client's best interest raises serious questions of professional ethics violations.
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III. MAKING THE APOLOGY
A. FACrORS
When discussing apology with a client, a lawyer should be sensitive
to other factors as well. I briefly address six considerations: (1) the appro-
priateness of the case for apology, (2) the timing of the apology, (3) the
scope of the apology, (4) the method of the apology, (5) nuance, and (6)
interpersonal variation. Following this, I offer some advice.
1. Appropriateness
Perhaps our presumption should be that apology has a role to play in
most cases.12 7 Many legal disputes arise because of injury. From a moral
viewpoint, one would hope that whenever an offender causes injury, he
would apologize by admitting fault to the extent he feels at fault, and by
expressing sympathy and remorse to the extent that he feels such sympathy
and remorse. Further, one would think that most injured parties want to
receive apologies. Exceptions to this can arise in extreme circumstances.
For example, a rape victim may revile the thought of the rapist expressing
his sympathy towards her, but may still want to hear the rapist admit his
fault.
Are certain cases particularly well-suited to apology? I can offer no
rule here, but I suggest that, as a first approximation, the indicators for
apology are in many respects similar to the indicators for mediation.128 Is
the injured party very angry? Is there a long-standing relationship between
the parties? Do the parties desire a future relationship? Is the root issue
between the parties a fundamentally different view of rights (in which case
there may be little room for an apology to make a difference), or is the root
issue a damaged relationship?
Often a helpful question to ask is whether the injured party has a
strong sense of having been "wronged." By definition, all injured parties
suffer injuries. However, not all injured parties suffer moral wrongs.
Most victims of car accidents would no doubt appreciate expressions of
sympathy and regret by the offender, but, generally they do not have a
strong sense of moral indignation (unless the injurer was morally wrong,
say, by driving drunk or recklessly). By contrast, a spouse whose partner
127. I thank Frank Sander for this suggestion.
128. See Sander & Goldberg, supra note 104, at 59. See also Levi, supra note 29, at 1199-1208
(describing classes of cases well-suited to apology).
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has cheated will have a great sense of moral offense from that breach of
trust. Where a moral wrong has occurred, an apology may be particularly
needed to make a moral accounting and restore the moral "universe" be-
tween the parties. 29 This is not to say that apology is unimportant when
injury occurs without moral offense, but rather that when moral offense is
present, apology is especially important. Finally, the obvious question
should not be overlooked: Does the absence of an apology seem to be a
significant barrier to resolving the dispute?
2. Scope
How broad should the apology be? Should one solely express one's
sympathy, without addressing issues like remorse or fault? Or should one
make a full apology which admits fault and expresses remorse to the extent
that one believes oneself at fault and feels remorse? While a full apology
will usually be most powerful, "merely" expressing sympathy can often be
a large step. A story Roger Fisher related to me about a PLO official who,
years before the Oslo accords, visited Auschwitz and Dachau on his two-
week summer vacation conveys this well. When Fisher described the of-
ficial's trip to some Israeli colleagues, many were skeptical at first: "Was
the PLO official motivated by some political strategy?" "No," said Fisher,
"I know him well. He said he simply went because he wanted to under-
stand better where the Jews came from." Thus assured, most of the Israelis
were deeply moved. That PLO official was no longer a faceless enemy,
but a person who actually sympathized with their people's suffering.
Expressing one's sympathy without expressing fault or remorse can
be a very useful step in those many cases where the extent of each party's
fault is unclear.130 The sewer repair company may be sorry that the pedes-
trian broke a leg when falling into the company's ditch, but be unsure
whether the problem was the pedestrian's lack of attention or the com-
pany's failing to have posted more warning signs. The company may fully
sympathize with the pedestrian's injury, and may be glad to make an ex-
pression of sympathy, but may not want to admit fault or express remorse.
Making an early expression of sympathy would track the very common
role of apology in Japan, where, following accidents, speedy apologies that
express sympathy but are not at root admissions of fault are the norm. 131
129. See GOFFMAN, supra note 28; Sitkin & Bies, supra note 23.
130. I thank Bruce Patton for this suggestion.
131. Comments Marishima, "In Japan, apology may mean an acknowledgment of guilt by the
morally guilty. But in most cases ... it doesn't mean that we are morally guilty, it just expresses sym-
pathy and a promise to deal with this matter with sincerity." International Workshop, supra note 68, at
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3. Timing
Timing is a critical factor in apology.132 A basic issue is whether to
apologize early (e.g., just after the injury) or late (e.g., once a legal claim
has been filed).
From a psychological viewpoint, there is much to be said for apolo-
gizing early. An early apology may prevent an injury from turning into a
dispute, nipping possible conflict in the bud. As Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat
have argued, legal disputes evolve in stages, with most injuries, and thus
potential disputes, being resolved before a legal claim is ever brought.
133
If, soon after an injury, the injured party receives an apology, the bitterness
of not receiving an apology may never set in, and the injured party may
never bring a legal claim.134  By subtracting the insult from the injury
through apology, litigation can often be avoided.
However, from a legal viewpoint, it may often be "safer" to apologize
late. As noted earlier, the protections of F.R.E. 408 only apply once
"compromise negotiations" have begun, and early on, soon after the injury,
that may by no means be clear. Similarly, while protections like mediation
and confidentiality agreements could theoretically be used soon after an
injury, often such mechanisms are not used until well after the injury has
occurred and the relationship between the parties has soured. Judicial
protective orders by definition come late into a dispute. Accordingly,
apologizing soon after the injury may make the most relational sense, but
may have the least legal protection. 135 One approach to consider is for the
offender to make an expression of sympathy soon after the injury, and wait
until a later stage, such as mediation, to "safely" offer a full apology which
admits fault.
4. Method
There are many methods for making apologies. Two common ques-
tions are whether'the apology should be made by the client or by the law-
yer, and whether it should be spoken or written.
757-58.
132. See Levi, supra note 29, at 1190-99; TAVUCHitS, supra note 22, at 87-90.
133. See Felstiner, supra note 36.
134. See Levi, supra note 29, at 1190. ("Apologizing before a complaint is formalized may derail
conflict before it starts. During this key period, the apologizer's conduct is still a 'virtual of-
fense'.... If an apology is accepted in this period, the offense will never be realized-the apologizer's
act will be viewed as innocent.").
135. However, late apologies frequently have dramatic effects, often more than a party might ex-
pect. See supra Part Il.D.5.
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Apologies are likely to be more powerful when they come from the
client rather than the lawyer. The root issue is sincerity. As an apology is
meant to demonstrate, inter alia, the offender's sympathy and remorse, an
apology by the client should have the greater effect. While there may be
occasions necessitating the lawyer's making the apology, such as when the
injured party is so antagonistic toward the offender that the party will not
listen to anything the offender might say, or when a very linguistically
precise apology is needed, on the whole, it is the client, rather than the
lawyer, who should apologize. This may run counter to some lawyers'
instinct of having their clients remain silent while the lawyer does the
talking and writing.
Both spoken or written apologies have merits, and one form need not
exclude the other. Hearing words straight from the offender's mouth is a
powerful experience, especially when sincerity is at issue, as speaking an
insincere apology convincingly face-to-face may be quite hard for many. 136
Eye contact can be especially important. However, signing one's name to
a written apology can also be quite powerful, with the signed testament
implying a certain deliberation and solemnity.
When choosing between speech and writing, two factors to keep in
mind are precision and record. When precision is critical, a written apol-
ogy can be helpful. For example, if one wishes to be precise about what
one is apologizing for and what one is not, or if one wants to minimize the
chance one's words will be misconstrued (for instance, that one's sympa-
thetic expression will not be taken as an admission of fault), writing can be
better than speech.
A written apology also creates a record. This may work to the of-
fender's detriment, such as when the injured party seeks to introduce it at
trial. On the other hand, having a record can be to the offender's benefit.
Some offenders want to introduce a written apology at trial with the hope
of reducing punitive damages. Other offenders may want to publicize the
apology, seeking to exonerate themselves in the public's eye. 137
136. Deceiving others in a face-to-face lie is no easy thing, for often involuntary cues will give
one away. See infra note 164.
137. A notable example is Texaco's "admit all" approach following the release of news accounts
of a history of racism at Texaco:
[O]nce the Times story appeared [documenting Texaco's racism], Texaco CEO Peter Bijur
quickly adopted a strategy known in public-relations circles as "total contrition." With [a]
p.r. maven.., at his side, Bijur issued a series of tortured apologies. "We care about each
and every employee," he said on a satellite broadcast. "I care deeply .... I am sorry for our
employees and both ashamed and angry that such a thing happened in the Texaco family."
Within two weeks, he turned the nightmare into an opportunity for enlightenment. He met
with Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton and asked for their help in making Texaco a "model of
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5. Nuance
As with all behavior subject to close scrutiny, nuance is critical in
apology. A slight difference in shading-whether in word, presentation, or
timing-can produce a vast difference in perception. Something as
"trivial" as speed can determine an apology's impact: An apology muttered
quickly can sound far less sincere than one stated deliberately.
The choice of language is one area in which nuance plays a large role,
and from both psychological and legal viewpoints the nuances of language
deserve attention. Psychologically speaking, saying "I'm sorry, but..." is
vastly different from saying "I'm sorry."' 38 The former negates the re-
morse through excuse or justification. Legally speaking, saying "I'm sorry
that I hit your car," is vastly different from saying "I'm sorry that we had
an accident." The former admits one's fault, but the latter does not. A
slight linguistic shift from active to passive voice ("I'm sorry that I broke
your vase" vs. "I'm sorry that your vase broke") can produce very different
meanings and legal consequences.
Lawyers may be drawn toward crafting apologies strategically: Is
there a way to give the injured party the psychological satisfaction of hav-
ing been "apologized to" without making a statement which could be used
as proof of the offender's fault?'39 Yet there is a downside to such craft-
ing. If the injured party perceives the apology as "over-crafted"-each
word chosen with legalistic precision to avoid ever admitting fault, then
the injured party may doubt the offender's sincerity. Making an apology is
a bit like paying a compliment. A natural expression will sound sincere,
but staged sycophancy will ring empty.
6. Interpersonal Variation
Different people have different attitudes toward apology. Some of-
fenders are comfortable with the idea of apologizing, and others are not.
Some injured parties care a great deal about receiving, or not having re-
diversity." He bravely shouldered the historical burden. "The moment is now, and the re-
sponsibility is ours to demonstrate to the nation that discrimination can be eradicated. That
true inclusion can exist. And that equal opportunity can be provided to every man and
woman," he said, sounding totally contrite at a November 15, 1996, press conference. "We
will work ceaselessly and tirelessly, day after day, to build a company of undisputed oppor-
tunity for all individuals." Hanna Rosin, Cultural Revolution at Texaco, THE NEw REPUBUIC,
Feb. 2, 1998, at 18:
138. See, e.g., HEITL, supra note 15, at 171-83 (stressing the role of language in psychological
aspects of apology).
139. Some might say this paper's discussion of "safe" apology falls into the vein of trying to give
the injured party maximal psychological satisfaction at the minimal legal exposure to the offender.
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ceived, an apology, and others care little. Different people may also un-
derstand communications quite differently. An offender who, after days of
soul searching, blurts out the words "I'm sorry" when he first sees the in-
jured party may be making what is to him a deep expression of remorse,
but the injured party may hear it as a cavalier statement. Hence, a lawyer
should try to help the client better understand both how others will inter-
pret the client's communications, and noncommunications, and how to in-
terpret the communications of others. This is not to say that the lawyer
knows the right way to understand communication. However, as the law-
yer will usually be more detached from the dispute than the client and be
more experienced at interpreting such communications than the client, the
lawyer may be a good counselor on such matters.
Cultural background may shape a client's attitude toward apology. 140
Perhaps no example is more striking than the contrast between Japanese
and American attitudes toward apology. In Japan, a society that places a
premium on maintaining social ordering and group cohesiveness, apology
is far more prevalent than in the United States. 141 Indeed, Americans go-
ing to Japan often need to learn to apologize more freely, and Japanese
coming to the United States often need to learn to apologize less freely.
Lawyers should be sensitive to such cultural differences. In particular, if
the injured party is from a culture that values apology highly, the of-
fender's lawyer should think carefully about whether an apology might
help resolve the dispute.
Gender differences may also play a role in apology, however, at this
point that role is not well-understood. There is some, albeit scant, empiri-
cal research suggesting that women put greater emphasis on apology than
men. 142 The argument appears to be that women tend to be more rela-
140. See Jeffrey Z. Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the Be-
holder, 7 NEG. J. 249 (1991). See also DAvID W. AUGSBURGER, CONFLICT MEDIATION ACROSS
CULTURES: PATHWAYS AND PATrERNS 259 (1992). Apologetic gestures exist among animals as well.
See Joan B. Silk, Making Amends: Adaptive Perspectives on Conflict Remediation in Monkeys, Apes,
and Humans, 9 HuM. NATURE 4, 341-68 (1998).
141. See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 10, at 493; Haley, supra note 10, at 502-03.
142. See O'Malley & Greenberg, supra note 32 (finding women tend to be more forgiving than
men once an apology is offered); Gonzales et al., supra note 32, at 698-99 (suggesting that women may
on average be more sensitive to interpersonal transgressions than men). But see Levi, supra note 29, at
1185-86. "Despite this [theoretical] speculation there is little data to support the proposition that
women are more likely to apologize. One study of apologetic strategies found that, '[c]ontrary to
popular stereotype,' women do not apologize more frequently than men." Id. at 1185 (citing Bruce
Fraser, On Apologizing, in CONVERSATIONAL ROUTINE: EXPLORATIONS IN STANDARDEZED COM-
MUNICATION SrrUATIONS AND PREPATrERNED SPEECH 259, 261 (Florian Coulman ed., 1981)). Note
that the critical issue here is not whether women and men tend to apologize at different frequencies in
routine conversations, but rather once an injury significant to raise legal concerns has occurred.
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tionally oriented than men, and thus more disposed toward apology, for
apology is often essential to maintaining or repairing a relationship.143
Perhaps the lesson to draw is not one about gender per se, but rather about
interpersonal differences in approaches to relationships: Those who value
relationships highly may be more ready to offer an apology when they in-
jure another, and more offended by the failure to receive an apology when
they are injured.
7. Summary Advice
In sum, the lawyer and the client-offender ought to think about
whether the case is appropriate for apology and, if so, how an apology
should be made. In particular, the lawyer might discuss with the client the
legal ramifications of apology and, if the client is concerned that an apol-
ogy will be used in court to show liability, how that risk may be mini-
mized. The lawyer and client should bear in mind that an early apology
soon after the injury, while it may be most promising relationally, may also
have the least legal protection, and that the "safest" avenue for apology
could come later. As mentioned before, one strategy is to make a state-
ment early on which expresses sympathy only, and to wait until a later
stage to make a full apology (one which also admits fault and expresses re-
gret) if need be. If such a full apology is to be made, a mediation session
preceded by a confidentiality agreement may often be the best place for it.
Not only are the statutory protections afforded mediation proceedings gen-
erally strong, but mediation is a natural forum for apology. If maintaining
insurance coverage is a concern, the possibility of admitting fault without
assuming financial liability should also be kept in mind.
B. FOUR EXAMPLES
To illustrate the application of apology in several common legal dis-
putes, consider four examples from the divorce, employment, car accident,
and medical malpractice settings. The first two are purely hypothetical,
though unfortunately not unrealistic. The latter two are slightly modified
retellings of actual events. For each, imagine being the defense counsel.
Consider what factors, legal and otherwise, would influence the advice you
might give your client about apology, and, assuming your client wanted
your advice on the matter, how you would suggest your client word an
apology.
143. See Levi, supra note 29, at 1185-86.
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1. Divorce
Bill and Sharon, both in their mid-thirties, were married eight years
ago. They have two children, ages four and six. Bill is a computer soft-
ware salesman who frequently takes two- to three-day marketing trips.
Sharon works mornings at a day care center and spends most afternoons at
home with the children. Over the past several years, their marriage has
steadily deteriorated, leaving both empty and bitter.
One afternoon, returning a day early from a marketing trip, Bill sees
Sharon's car parked in front of Peppers, a local restaurant. Peering inside,
he spots Sharon seated at a table with Ted Shuman, a neighbor. They are
laughing and giggling together. At one point, Ted caresses her on the
cheek. Bill heads home.
A few hours later, Sharon arrives. Bill asks, "Where have you been?"
"Just doing errands," Sharon says. "I thought I saw you having lunch at
Peppers with Ted Shuman," he says. At first she denies it, but then she
admits it. She even admits to having an affair with Ted. Enraged, Bill
leaves.
A few days later, Bill phones. "I've talked to a lawyer," Bill says. He
adds, "I want a divorce." "Okay," says Sharon.
Sharon comes to you, a divorce lawyer, and relays the facts above.
She is quite clear that she too wants a divorce. "Bill's finding out about
my affair with Ted-that was just a trigger. The marriage died long ago. I
don't hate Bill, but I don't want to be married to him. All I really care
about is that the kids are okay."
Analysis
Sharon has much to gain, and little to lose, by offering an apology. In
the short run, she and Bill will need to reach a mutually acceptable divorce
agreement, or they will face having a judge decide the details of their di-
vorce. In the long run, she and Bill will have to interact for more than a
decade over the rearing of their children. Until Bill can move beyond his
anger at Sharon, even minimal cooperation between the two may be im-
possible. Sharon could apologize for her affair with Ted, and thus take an
important step towards a workable divorce agreement and relationship with
Bill.
Mediation is a natural place for Sharon to apologize, as divorce set-
tlements are often mediated. Further, local statutes may deem mediation
discussions strictly confidential. Bill and Sharon might also sign a confi-
dentiality agreement before the mediation proceedings. If Bill is unwilling
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to go to mediation, Sharon should still think seriously about apologizing.
She has already admitted to Bill that she has had an affair with Ted, so
admitting this again will not put her in a worse position. If Bill will hear
her out, a face-to-face apology would probably be best.
What might Sharon say? Assuming Sharon's goals are to reduce
Bill's anger and to assuage some of her guilt, but not to continue the mar-
riage, she might make an apology along the following lines:
Bill, I'm sorry that I cheated on you. It was the wrong thing to do. My
intention was never to hurt you, although I am sure that I have.
We both know that our marriage failed a long time ago. I should have
faced up to that before-directly-rather than having an affair with Ted.
It was wrong of me. I want you to know that I've been seeing Ted for
about three or four months. I'm not saying this to make you feel bad,
though I realize it might, but I want you to know the truth. The time you
saw me wasn't the first time with Ted. I want to face up'to that.
I'm not saying that I want us to get back together. I don't. A divorce is
the right thing for both of us. But I do want you to know that I never in-
tended to hurt you, and I think that what I did was wrong. I should have
just had the courage to say that I wanted to end the marriage.
What I'd like to be able to do now is to find an agreement that works
well for the kids. I'm sure that you're mad at me. I deserve that. But I
hope that we won't ruin our kids' lives.
I'd really like to hear what you're thinking and feeling.
Note Sharon's attempt to differentiate the impact or consequences of
her actions, which include harming Bill, from her intentions. ("My inten-
tion was never to hurt you, although I am sure that I have.") Often a state-
ment both acknowledging the harm one has caused another and expressing
that one did not intend or desire to harm the other can greatly help in de-
fusing conflict.
2. Employment
Ron Basil, a computer software engineer, has worked for five years at
Netware Corp. in the State of Ames. During the first three years of his
employment, he received a series of rapid promotions. However, for the
past two years, his requests for further advancement have been denied.
The change began when he entered a division headed by Cynthia Supreme.
Basil believes that Supreme, who is white, discriminated against him be-
cause he is black. Basil frequently heard Supreme making what he took as
racist comments ("We need the right type of people in management" and
"People should stick with people of their own kind"). He complained sev-
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eral times to the company's president, Andrea Jefferson. Jefferson spoke
with Supreme, who denied any racism. Jefferson took no further action.
Basil recently overheard Supreme stating to another division head,
Fred Cogan, "Blacks never do any good work." That was the last straw.
Basil quit and promptly filed suit. After receiving notice of the claim, Jef-
ferson launched a thorough investigation. To her shock, the investigation
revealed credible evidence of racism not only by Supreme, but by several
other managers including Cogan. She then fired Supreme, Cogan, and
those other managers. Both because Netware is now understaffed and be-
cause of her moral sensibilities, not to mention the legalities, Jefferson
would like to have Basil return to the company. Assume that Basil's em-
ployment contract included a mandatory mediation clause and that Ames
grants strong confidentiality protection to mediation.
Analysis
This is an excellent case for an apology within the context of media-
tion. Even with Supreme, Cogan, and several other racist managers fired,
an apology by Jefferson would be an important recognition to Basil of the
harms that he suffered and could be an essential step to getting him to re-
turn to the company. 44 It would not, of course, preclude monetary com-
pensation for past harms, and Basil's attorney should ensure that Basil is
aware of that. While Jefferson may not have "standing" to assume re-
sponsibility for what racist managers like Supreme actually said and did,
she can express her regret that she did not investigate Basil's earlier com-
plaints thoroughly and that she ran a company with a racist work environ-
ment. She might even thank Basil for bringing suit. For Basil to feel com-
fortable returning to Netware, a dialogue about the past seems essential,
and mediation is a fine place to initiate it. With the confidentiality protec-
tions afforded mediation by the State of Ames, Jefferson can feel free to
speak candidly. Further, as the employment contract calls for mediation,
both parties should be receptive to that process.
3. Car Accident
Driving to work in his BMW, Mr. Trendle approached a congested
rotary. Looking to his left at the oncoming cars, Mr. Trendle saw a break
in the traffic and accelerated into the rotary. Unfortunately, he failed to
see the small, red hatchback to his right that had slowed in the rotary traf-
fic, and he crashed into it from behind. Both the hatchback and Mr.
Trendle pulled onto the inner rotary shoulder and stopped. Though Mr.
144. Were Supreme willing, she might also apologize to Basil within the mediation context.
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Trendle believed that he was driving at no more than five to ten miles per
hour at the time, the rear bumper of the hatchback was clearly dented. A
roughly forty-year-old woman, Ms. Reardon, emerged from the hatchback,
holding her neck. They swapped addresses and registration and insurance
information. Ms. Reardon said that she was on her way to the nearby
hospital where she worked, and, though it didn't feel serious, she would
get her neck checked out there.
A few days later, Mr. Trendle calls you, his lawyer. Sounding guilt-
ridden, he asks, "Should I call Ms. Reardon to see how she is doing? Can I
tell her that I'm sorry for having hit her?"
Analysis
A lawyer might advise Mr. Trendle as follows: "Whatever you do,
don't contact Reardon. Definitely don't apologize to her-that will just
make you look bad. If Reardon contacts you, just let me or your insurance
company handle it. Maybe Reardon is fine and has forgotten about the
whole thing, or maybe Reardon is one of those charlatans who pulls up
short in front of an expensive car to cause an accident so that she can sue
for whiplash. Let's just wait for now."14 5 However, that is not what hap-
pened in the actual example. In the actual example, 'Mr. Trendle" was
himself an attorney. After several days of careful thought, he wrote Ms.
Reardon a note. I paraphrase:
Dear Ms. Reardon,
I write to express my wishes that you are doing well following our acci-
dent several days ago. I am very sorry to have hit you from behind.
Please let me know if there are any expenses that you incurred in relation
to the accident. From what I remember, the bumper on your car was
damaged. I would be happy to reimburse you for the cost of repairing it
or other damage to the car.
Again, I hope you are doing well.
Sincerely yours,
Mr. Trendle
When I questioned Mr. Trendle about the note, he explained his deci-
sion as follows. First, he did want to say that he was sorry for having hit
Ms. Reardon's car. He felt guilty for having damaged her car and possibly
having harmed her, and he wanted to express his sympathy and regret.
Second, he did not want his insurance premiums raised, and he thought it
145. Mr. Trendle's insurance company might also discourage apology. See supra note 9.
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would be cheaper to pay directly for the small cost of repairing the
bumper. He also believed that in the off chance that there were large dam-
ages at issue because of personal injury, his insurance company (and not
he) would have to pay those damages. Third, he realized that his note, es-
pecially the second sentence admitting fault, could be used against him as
proof of liability. However, he thought that Ms. Reardon already had am-
ple evidence to prove his liability irrespective of the note, for he hit her car
from behind, and he did not think that the note would materially damage
his legal position.
A more cautious approach would have been to write a note expressing
sympathy for the injury without admitting fault ("Dear Ms. Reardon, I
write to express my wishes that you are feeling well following our accident
several days ago. Sincerely yours, Mr. Trendle.") and to wait until later to
admit fault (but not assume liability), ideally in a "safe" channel such as
mediation. In the off event that Ms. Reardon's injuries proved severe, this
would pose less of a risk, albeit what I would assess as a very slight risk, of
voiding his insurance coverage. However, in Mr. Trendle's case the fuller
letter worked quite well. Shortly after receiving his letter, Ms. Reardon
called Mr. Trendle to let him know that her neck felt fine. Later she re-
layed to him the cost of repairing the bumper, and he reimbursed her.
Equally important, Mr. Trendle felt good for having offered an apology for
the harm he caused. While many persons are not as sensitive as Mr.
Trendle, this mattered to him.
4. Medical Malpractice
One afternoon an old college friend, who is now an orthopedic sur-
geon, calls you, a medical malpractice lawyer. He wants to see you as
soon as he can. You arrange for him to come to your home that night. He
arrives looking disheveled. You exchange pleasantries and offer him a
seat. You ask him what's up, and he states the following:
I was operating this morning on a woman, fifty-two, who had a herniated
lumbar disk. I went in to remove it and fuse the adjacent vertebra. It's a
challenging operation, but not uncommon, and I've done it many times.
The reason I'm here is that, when I was about halfway through, I acciden-
tally nicked the dura. I had removed most of the disk, when my hand just
slipped. The dura is a thin, sheath-like coating that covers the spinal cord
and holds in the spinal fluid. Nicking it is something I've seen other
doctors do occasionally, but they don't talk about it much. Anyway, I
stitched up the dura as best I could to stop the leakage, and finished the
rest of the operation.
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The odds are that the stitching of the dura will work fine, but it doesn't
always, and either of two problems could develop. First, the suturing
may have failed to totally shut off the leakage. If this happens, the pa-
tient could show strong neurological symptoms in about three or four
days, and we'll have to go in and repair the leakage. Second, the patient
could develop what's known as a pseudo-meningocoele. This means that
the spinal fluid is not circulating enough around the wounded area. It
usually takes about two to four months to develop. There are neurologi-
cal symptoms, and again you have to go back in and try to fix it.
My question is whether I should say anything about it. As it is, the pa-
tient is scheduled to go home tomorrow by about 11:00 a.m. A herniated
disk operation is slated for a twenty-four hour turnaround, meaning they
send you home within twenty-four hours of surgery. Usually, this is
enough time, and it is good to get the patient back on his feet as soon as
possible. However, where you've nicked the dura, it's probably not the
best thing to do. Really, the best thing would be for the patient to lie as
still as possible for the next three to four days to give the dura as much of
a chance as possible to heal. Also, an MRI should probably be done in a
few days to check on the condition of the dura. I'm wondering what I
should do. Many doctors don't say anything to the patient when this
happens and just send the patient home the next day.
Analysis
The first issue the surgeon faces is whether to say something (and
keep the patient in the hospital three or four more days) or to remain silent
(and let her be discharged the following day). The arguments for saying
something and keeping the patient in the hospital are compelling. First, the
patient's health is at greater risk if the physician says nothing and sends
her home the next day. Second, making a mistake during an operation is
not necessarily malpractice, but failing to disclose an important medical
risk to a patient and prescribing what one knows to be a medically sub-
optimal course of treatment would likely constitute gross malpractice. 146
Clearly, the doctor must say something.
146. See Darrell L Keith, The Court's Charge in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 48 BAYLOR
L REV. 675, 701, 713 (1996) (defining ordinary negligence under Texas law as the "failure to do that
which a physician of reasonable (or ordinary) prudence would have done under the same or similar
circumstances or doing that which a physician of reasonable (or ordinary) prudence would not have
done under the same or similar circumstances," and defining gross negligence as "such an entire want
of care as to indicate that the act or omission in question was the result of conscious indifference to the
rights, welfare, or safety of the person affected by it').
Note that some commentators have argued that physicians should be placed under a general legal
duty to disclose errors to their patients, irrespective of whether such disclosure will impact on the pa-
tient's health. See Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians' Duty to Disclose
Medical Error, 28 UCLA L REv. 52 (1980); Theodore R. LeBlang & Jane L. King, Tort Liability for
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What should the doctor say? One approach is for the doctor to
straightforwardly tell the patient the whole truth and apologize for the
mistake he made.147 On the one hand, such honesty will likely boost the
patient's respect for the doctor's character and trust in the doctor as a per-
son. On the other hand, this approach may lead the patient to lose confi-
dence in the doctor's medical skills. In addition, there is the very slight
risk that such an admission could jeopardize the doctor's malpractice cov-
erage. 148
A second approach would be to try to reveal the patient's medical
condition without revealing the doctor's own mistake or admitting liability.
Nuance (or, in political terminology, "spin control") is critical to such an
effort. Rather than saying to the patient, "I made a mistake during the op-
eration yesterday and accidentally cut into the casing around your spinal
cord," the doctor might say:
I want to let you know that there was a small complication during yester-
day's surgery. There was a small tear in what's called the "dura", a thin,
sheath-like casing around the spinal cord that holds in the spinal fluid.
We stitched it up, and everything should be okay. We want to keep you
in the hospital for a few extra days-maybe three or four-to make sure
that it heals properly. The main thing for you to do is just lie still, for the
more still you are the easier it is for the dura to heal. In a couple of days
we'll take another MRI to make sure everything's okay. It's likely you
would be fine if we released you today, but I want us to be on the safe
side.
By casting his mistake as a "small complication," the doctor may both
reveal the patient's medical condition and hope to maintain a positive
relationship with the patient. While there is no guarantee whether the
patient will sue later, a well-nuanced statement could go a long way toward
preventing such an outcome. Further, if suit does occur, the (small) risk
that the doctor has voided his insurance coverage by his statement will be
reduced.
Nondisclosure: The Physician's Legal Obligations to Disclose Patient Illness and Injury, 89 DICK. L
REV. 1, 35-51 (1984). For a similar discussion on Canadian law, see Gerald Robertson, Fraudulent
Concealment and the Duty to Disclose Medical Mistakes, 25 ALBERTA L. REv. 215 (1980).
147. As to whether there are legally "safe" avenues (such as in-hospital mediation) that the doctor
might use, even if a plausible avenue existed, it would likely be impractical in this case as time is so
critical. Further, even were the doctor to apologize within a "safe" avenue, in this case making a "safe"
apology still poses a significant risk: Such an apology would inform the patient of the doctor's mistake
and the patient might then sue.
148. See supra Part I.C.3.
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Some might say that the second approach, while legally savvy, is de-
plorable from the viewpoint of medical ethics: 149 The doctor should tell the
patient the whole truth-fully confess to having nicked the dura-and not
some partial, slanted version of the truth that serves the doctor's, rather
than the patient's, best interests.1 50 Further, if the doctor really cares about
having a positive relationship with the patient, the best foundation is by re-
vealing the whole truth. A doctor who wants to be fully forthcoming
should be counted as morally praiseworthy, and a lawyer counseling such a
doctor should simply inform her of the relevant legal risks. However, for
those unwilling to go that far, offering a well-nuanced explanation is better
than offering none.
IV. LEGAL REFORM
Shifting from the perspective of a lawyer seeking to advise a client to
adopt a legislative or public policy orientation, it is interesting to ask
whether our existing legal structures adequately facilitate apologies.
A goal of law in this area should be to permit an offender to make a
full and "safe" apology immediately after the injury or at any time thereaf-
ter, should he so choose. (An offender who wishes to make an "unsafe"
apology that may be used against him in court should also be free to do so.)
While some may argue that rules, including existing rules, which allow for
"safe" apology cheapen the value of an apology,151 encouraging apologies
to occur early on may prevent many injuries from escalating into legal dis-
putes. An early apology can avoid compounding the insult of not apologiz-
ing on top of the injury. Late apologies may in some cases be appropriate,
but on the whole the earlier the apology occurs, the better. Further, the law
should not penalize the "good" person who, in an effort to make amends,
apologizes soon after an injury as compared to the crafty person, who
would wait to apologize until any statement she might make was legally
"safe."
From such a viewpoint, the state of our current legal rules is poor.
Though once disputes are well under way, mechanisms such as mediation,
confidentiality agreements, F.R.E. 408, and judicial orders do provide
149. See Wu et al., supra note 8; Finkelstein et al.; supra note 8; Robin et al., supra note 8.
150. Even if, arguendo, the proposed statement serves the patient's medical interests as well as a
full confession, it serves the patient's financial interests, which include possible medical malpractice
damages, less well.
151. For a response to this position, see infra Part V.B (arguing that the bifurcated message of
"safe" apology can have much meaning).
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some "safety" for making an apology, 152 our existing laws provide scant
protection for making a "safe" apology early on. As mechanisms for
"safe" apology, confidentiality agreements are quite weak, and judicial or-
ders, by definition, come quite late. While parties could go to mediation
quite soon after an injury, this step may often be awkward. While F.R.E.
408 does provide some protection for statements made early on, it has
many gaps. Two central gaps are that the statement must be made in the
course of, but not before, compromise negotiations, and that statements
made in compromise negotiations may be admitted at trial for purposes
other than proving liability. The question arises: Could our laws be modi-
fied to make it easier for "safe" apology to take place soon, if not immedi-
ately, after the injury?
One theoretically appealing approach would be to plug the existing
gaps in F.R.E. 408. In response to the first gap, one could make an apol-
ogy a presumptive trigger for the F.R.E. 408 protections. More specifi-
cally, one could modify F.R.E. 408 and analogous state provisions so that
the offer of apology raises a rebuttable presumption of compromise nego-
tiations. There is some appeal in this. An apology often indicates that the
offender believes that the injury is serious. When an injury is serious, the
offender is probably aware that a legal claim is pending when making the
apology. If such an approach were taken, the second gap in F.R.E. 408
would also have to be closed. Unfortunately, such modifications to F.R.E.
408 would be difficult to achieve legislatively. Courts, however, could
look to such reasoning in their application of F.R.E. 408 and analogous
state provisions.
A second and more feasible approach would be to create an eviden-
tiary exclusion for apologies independent of F.R.E. 408.153 There is a cer-
tain irony under the current Federal Rules, which through specific eviden-
tiary exclusions for subsequent remedial measures 154 and payment of
152. Such laws might be improved by greater standardization, but that is a separate issue.
153. Any rule creating special evidentiary restrictions for apologies will have to face the question
of where to draw lines concerning what is and what is not an apology. Would, for example, statements
which merely express sympathy but do not admit liability be protected? Would statements which
admit liability but do not express regret be protected? Would statements "indirectly" apologizing be
covered? And, perhaps most fundamentally, how would one distinguish between apologies and non-
apology admissions of fault? When necessary, such issues could be faced and met.
154. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 ("Subsequent Remedial Measures") provides in part:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken
previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subse-
quent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a prod-
uct, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.
FED. R. EviD. 407.
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medical and similar expenses, 155 encourage offenders to take steps toward
physical repair following an injury but discourage the often more funda-
mental relational and psychological repair potentially afforded, and only
afforded, by an apology. Under the current rules, you can build a fence
around the pit into which the plaintiff fell and you can offer to pay the
plaintiff's hospital bills, but you cannot say that you are sorry. Yet a root
motivation behind these exclusions as well as for F.R.E. 408 is that the law
should neither inhibit the practice of "humane impulses" nor "discourage
assistance to the injured person."'156 While an apology qua admission dif-
fers from these excluded categories, surely this motivation applies with
equal, if not greater force, to the case of apology.
What form might a specific evidentiary exclusion for apologies take?
Three possibilities are to exclude: (i) any apology, such as a spontaneous
apology, which occurred within a certain, brief period after the injury; (ii)
any sincere apology; or (iii) any apology.
It is reasonable to think that an apology which occurs just after an in-
jury is sincere. A spontaneous apology is most likely motivated by re-
morse, not guile, coming from a "good" person who by instinct wants to
make amends. While protecting apologies made within a certain, brief pe-
riod after the injury would not permit "safe" apology to occur at all times
following an injury, it would help facilitate an important class of apologies
not well-covered by the existing rules. It would also be an easy rule to
administer.
As between the second and the third possibilities above, while pro-
tecting only sincere apologies may be more appealing theoretically, pro-
tecting all apologies may be more practical. If one of the rationales for
protecting apologies from evidentiary use is to encourage those who wish
to resolve disputes to make sincere, good-faith apologies, why should the
law protect those who make insincere, bad-faith apologies? 157 On a theo-
retical level, distinguishing between insincere and sincere apologies seems
appealing; however, it may be unworkable. In many cases, it would be ex-
tremely difficult to judge the offender's intent.
This theoretical issue points to a general concern: If our legal mecha-
nisms cannot differentiate between sincere and insincere apologies, does
155. Federal Rule of Evidence 409 ("Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses") provides,
"Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occa-
sioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury." FED. R. EviD. 409.
156. FED. R. EViD. 409 advisory committee's note (commenting on the purposes of Rules 407,
408, and 409).
157. See infra Part V.A (discussing insincere apologies).
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not any legal mechanism which allows for "safe" apology-including the
existing legal mechanisms-ran the risk of abuse? Might not some of-
fenders use "safe" channels to offer insincere apologies with the hope of
duping the other party and resolving the dispute? Rules that allow for
"safe" apology do run this risk; however, it is a risk worth taking. The re-
cipient is always free to judge the sincerity of the apology, and for many
offenders making an insincere apology seem sincere is difficult. 1a8 Fur-
ther, by not offering "safe" avenues for apology, society may cause
many disputes to escalate to litigation which could readily be avoided if
only an apology were offered. At times society might also have an
"epidemiological" interest in permitting "safe" apology. 159 "Safe" apology
encourages people who have made mistakes to reveal those mistakes, and
it is only once we know about mistakes that we can work at finding ways
to avoid similar mistakes in the future. 160 Some avenues do now exist for
offering "safe" apologies; however, often these avenues are only of use
fairly late in the dispute. Better public policy would offer earlier avenues
for "safe" apology.
V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Some may raise ethical questions about the possible misuse of apol-
ogy. Below I address two such questions. First, is it wrong for a client
who does not feel remorse but thinks apologizing will be strategically ad-
vantageous to apologize? Second, is it wrong to make a "safe" apology, or,
put differently, is not the willingness to make amends through paying
compensation for the harm one has done an integral part of a sincere apol-
ogy?
158. See infra note 164.
159. See Edward A. Dauer & Leonard J. Marcus, Adapting Mediation to Link Resolution of
Medical Malpractice Disputes with Health Care Quality Improvement, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS.
185 (1997) (suggesting that using mediation rather than litigation to resolve disputes may provide im-
portant information for preventing future medical errors).
160. If a medical resident errs when treating a patient, it is not only important that the patient
know of it, it is important that the hospital learn of it in order to prevent similar mistakes in the future.
However, mistakes are often unreported, possibly motivated by fears of liability. See Wu et al., supra
note 8, at 770 ("Even when a definite mistake results in serious injury, the patient often is not told. In
one study, house officers reported telling their attending physicians about serious medical mistakes
only half the time, and telling the patients and families in less than a quarter of cases."). But see
Miller, supra note 7, at 435 (the issue of liability largely removed because in Britain's national health
care system, the focus of both the injured and the system shifts away from liability).
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A. APOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE
Some may ask whether I am advocating that a lawyer advise a client
who does not feel remorse to apologize in order to obtain a strategic advan-
tage. For example, a lawyer could tell a client, "The plaintiff might drop
the suit if you apologize. Even if you are not sorry, you might just say that
you are sorry and see what happens." Strict consequentialists may see lit-
tle harm in this: If the plaintiff takes the apology to be sincere and forgives
the defendant, who is worse off? The defendant would be happy to have
the case settled, and the plaintiff would be happy to have received what is
believed to be a sincere apology.
I take a different view. Advising clients to misrepresent their remorse
so as to gain a strategic advantage is, in my opinion, no different from ad-
vising clients to lie about any other matter for a strategic advantage. Both
are wrong. While some may think that "white" lies do little harm, "white"
lies are usually justified by their triviality. Lying to gain a strategic advan-
tage in a dispute is by no means trivial. 6 ' Lying about such remorse may
well constitute fraud, the counseling of which certainly violates legal and
professional ethics.' 62
But in some cases, I think that clients will not feel much remorse of
their own initiative. However, if the subject of apology is broached by
their lawyers, clients may well feel remorse. Accordingly, I think it is fine
for lawyers to ask clients questions about apology (such as, "Have you
thought about apologizing for any of what took place?" or "Would you
consider making a statement expressing sympathy for the plaintiff's medi-
cal condition?"). I expect that there are few alleged offenders who, when
sensitively asked about the subject, feel absolutely no sympathy for the
other side's injury.
161. On the ethics of lying generally, see SiSSELA BoK, LYING: MORAL CHoicE IN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LIFE (1978). On the ethics of lying in negotiation, see generally Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The
Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 76 IOWA L REV. 1219 (1990) (arguing that a great deal of negotiation
involves lying). On white lies, see BOK at 60, and Wetlaufer at 1243.
162. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY EC-7-9, DR 7-102 (1995) ("In his rep-
resentation of a client, a lawyer shall not: ... (5) knowingly make a false statement of law or fact...
(7) counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent."); ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1992) ("In the course of representing a client a
lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b)
fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a crimi-
nal or fraudulent act by a client .... ). See generally Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiations:
Are There Any?, 56 LA. L REV. 447 (1995) (discussing the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as they relate to ethics in negotiations).
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I also believe that it is acceptable for a lawyer to point out to a client
that offering an apology may yield strategic benefits ("You know, if you
apologized, they might drop the suit."). While some may argue that telling
people that they may receive financial benefits from apologizing is ethi-
cally questionable, I do not.1 63 Often people gain financial benefits from
doing what is ethically right. For example, a businessperson may gain a
profitable reputation for fair dealing by being honest. It is fine to draw
business-people's attention to this. There is no rule saying that morally
praiseworthy acts must be self-sacrificing.
Further, making an insincere apology "successfully" may not be as
easy as the Machiavellian might think. The listener is always free to assess
the sincerity of the apology. An insincere client trying to appear sincere is
risky business, especially when apologizing face-to-face. 164 Further dy-
namics may also come into play. The drive to reduce cognitive dissonance
is a powerful psychological force.165 For some, preparing to make and
making an apology may trigger a process of internal remorse. Saying
you're sorry may help you to feel sorry.
I am not suggesting that apology or other such expressions could not
be abused by the devious, 166 or that a self-respecting lawyer should help to
foster such abuse. However, many clients would, if the possibility of apol-
ogy were raised with them in a sensitive manner, explore the possibility of
apology with integrity and sincerity. When an injury has occurred, apolo-
gizing to the extent one believes one is at fault is morally praiseworthy.
Perhaps the ethical "burden of proof' falls not on those lawyers who would
163. More generally, some may feel that any instrumentalization of apology is wrong. If the heart
of apology is the feeling of internal remorse, is it not wrong to apologize, or to counsel apology, with
other goals in mind? I do not take such a dichotomized view. While remorse may and perhaps should
be the central motivating factor behind an apology, I do not believe that it need be the only factor moti-
vating an apology.
164. See ROBERT N. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF EMOTIONS 126
(1988). See also KATHLEEN VALLEY, JOSEPH MOAG & MAX H. BAZERMAN, A MATrER OF TRUST:
EFECrS OF COMMUNICATION ON EFFICIENCY AND DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES (Harvard Business
School Working Paper, 1996) (on the importance of face-to-face communication in building trust).
165. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OFCOGNrIVEDISSONANCE (1957).
166. See Goldberg et al., supra note 4, at 222-23 (reporting a particularly distasteful case where,
following a 1985 plane crash, Delta Air Lines first approached victims or decedents' families in a
friendly, supportive manner-thereby preventing many lawsuits-only later to take a very hostile
stance toward families that did sue, at times using information gained while in the "friendly" posture
against such a family in subsequent litigation). "Thus, the attorney alleges, a distraught family member
had told a sympathetic adjuster that the victim, a married man, had been having an extramarital affair.
'They [later] threw it back at us in settlement talks and really took us by surprise."' Id. at 223.
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raise the possibility of apology with clients, but on those who fail to do
so.167
B. "SAFE APOLOGY"
Some may feel that "safe" apologies are duplicitous: If you are really
sorry, should you not be willing to pay for what you have done? To many
the message, "I'm sorry, but I don't want anything I'm saying to be used
against me to make me pay for it," rings empty. Many may think that if
you are unwilling to "put your money where your mouth is" you are insin-
cere. As Wagatsuma and Rosett argue, "An apology without reparation is
a hollow form, at least when the injured person has suffered a clear eco-
nomic loss and when the actor has the capacity to make compensation."'168
The recipient of an apology may certainly take note of the fact that the
apology was made in a "safe" context; however, the fact that the sincerity
of a "safe" apology may be discounted does not mean that a "safe" apology
is duplicitous. If, as the recipient of an apology, you know that the apolo-
gizer has apologized in such a way as to ensure insulation from legal li-
ability, you may attach less worth to that apology than otherwise, and a
plaintiff's lawyer should be sure to point this out to her client. However,
that does not mean the apologizer is engaged in an ethically unacceptable
act. Indeed, it is only when the recipient is unaware that the apology has
been so insulated, thinking that a "safe" apology is "unsafe," that I see
such an apology as ethically problematic.
"Safe" apology offers an avenue for decoupling the issue of apology
from the issue of liability, and as such may help avoid much needless
conflict. "Safe" apology helps prevent the insult of not saying one is sorry
from adding to the already existing injury. "Safe" apology does not make
the issue of liability disappear, but it lets the parties speak with one another
without the specter of liability lurking in the background. Indeed, the need
to find "safe" avenues for apology may itself be viewed as a response to
the impact of the liability system on discourse. If offenders were not afraid
that their apologies might be used against them in court, they might be
more forthcoming with them. 169
167. There is also an ethical challenge to an injured party who would use the offender's apology
against the offender in court. If the offender has come in good faith to settle the dispute, is it wrong for
the injured party to use the apology to the offender's harm?
168. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 10, at 487.
169. See supra note 7.
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The motive behind and message within a "safe" apology can be intel-
ligible, meaningful, and morally upright. An offender may well want to
express, "I am sorry about the accident-it was my fault, and I feel bad
that you are injured," but at the same time not want to pay more toward
that injury than he must. I think that many injured parties can understand
this, view a "safe" apology as sincere, and derive benefit from it. Indeed,
in much the same way conversations on airplanes between strangers can be
candid since they will have no repercussions, there may be much moral
power to a "safe" apology whereby the offender offers a bifurcated state-
ment, saying in effect, "I admit that what I did was wrong, and I am sorry




It is easy to see our world the way it is, and lose sight of the way it
should be. When an offender injures another, one would hope that, to the
extent that the offender feels at fault, he would apologize. This is not only
sound morality, it is a good way to prevent protracted disputes. An apol-
ogy helps to subtract the insult from the injury, thereby minimizing the in-
jured party's anger toward the offender. Without an apology, what might
have been a minor offense may escalate into a major dispute.
While one could argue that lawyers should discuss the possibility of
apology with clients more often because apologizing when one has injured
another is the right thing to do, which is true, or because society would be
better off if more offenders apologized, which is also true, I have not done
so here. Rather, I have argued that lawyers should discuss apology more
often with their clients because often doing so would make their clients
better off. (Discussing apology with clients may make many lawyers
worse off, but that is another matter.) In many cases, the potential benefits
of apology are great, and when care is taken in how the apology is made-
within a "safe" legal mechanism like mediation, and with attention to nu-
ances such as admitting fault without assuming liability if insurance cover-
age is at issue-the risks of apology are small. While our laws could be
and should be reworked to make "safe" apology easier, our existing legal
rules allow apologies to play a much larger role in legal disputes than they
now do.
170. Lawyers may easily understand the bifurcation of liability and damages as these elements are
commonly separated in trials. Clients, however, may find this bifurcation confusing. Plaintiffs' attor-
neys in particular should help their clients realize that following a defendant's offer of apology, the
issue of (monetary) damages remains.
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Incorporating apology into one's repertoire would be a small change
for most lawyers, but it could produce a dramatic change in how we settle
disputes. In most disputes, apology has the potential to play an important
role. Injuries are frequently unavoidable, but an offender's compounding
an injury with the insult of falling to apologize is not. Apology is often a
key element, if not the key element, to resolving a dispute. Lawyers ought
to discuss apology more often with clients.
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